There are three border crossings between Jordan and Palestine: the Allenby/King Hussein Bridge is the closest one to Jerusalem. It is built on the lowest ground in the area, at the same level as the Dead Sea. The border is not a line. It is a space with depth to it. It is made of similar materials to those in cities but used differently. Inside the border, the rules are few but essential. All flows are strictly monitored and controlled. The border is a machine which tears apart everything that crosses it into separate, classifiable elements, only to put them back again together, somehow or another, when they exit. This applies to people, too, not just objects.

Tala, my daughter, was born in Bethlehem on a beautiful spring morning in the month of February. She was birthed in a clinic built with funds from the Japanese government and tended by a Palestinian nurse who spoke perfect Neapolitan, learned during a long stay in Naples where he had studied. After the first few days spent rejoicing in her arrival, we found ourselves faced with a dilemma: how is Tala going to be able to cross the border and get out of the Occupied Territories? How will the border machine work on her, with a Palestinian mother, Sandi, and an Italian father? If Tala leaves Bethlehem as an ‘Italian’ she’ll only be able to come back as a tourist; if she leaves Bethlehem as a ‘Palestinian’ she will be treated as such by the Israeli army; she will not be able to move freely around the Occupied Territories and Israel.

By being half-Italian and half-Palestinian, Tala puts the pre-established spatial and political order into crisis, revealing the fiction of national belonging and all the politics that stem from it. The mere thought of having to face with her the device that awaits us on the Jordanian border, the only entry and exit point for Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, is deeply disturbing to me. The idea of being forced to be stripped bare by the border machine makes almost any certainty you have about your rights and existence falter. The border machine is interactive architecture: it changes depending on the citizenship of the person who crosses over it. As a prototype of biopolitical architecture, maybe in its purest form, it becomes porous depending on the nation it belongs to: it constructs and deconstructs itself
depending on the relationship that each individual has with the state; a regulating device that mediates between birth and nationhood.

We hire the usual group taxi, a dilapidated yellow Mercedes. Concerns about the trip are magnified by the sense of uncertainty. How many times have I heard it said that the real problem is not knowing what the rules are? Take the roads, for example. The Israeli army can decide for security reasons to blockade a given part of a road used on a daily basis by thousands of Palestinians. The blockade is enforced by deploying patrols, roadblocks and barriers. After a few months, even though the roadblocks have been removed, the Palestinians—fearful of running up against soldiers and being arrested—choose not to use the road anymore, thus leaving it to the exclusive use of the colonists. The regime of prohibitions is implemented by verbal orders given by Israeli military officers who control a given area of the territory. Palestinians found on a road prohibited to them or for which they lack the required permit risk being put into jail or having their vehicle confiscated. They are forced to use group transportation vehicles that shuttle between one checkpoint and another.

The first time I arrived here from Jordan, I met up with the Jordanian police and then with the Israeli forces, assisted by a Palestinian police unit. Now the Palestinians have been moved away from the border and have set up a sham border of a non-existent state on a piece of land measuring 150 by 500 feet (approx. 46 x 152 metres). The Palestinian border is like a service station that leads nowhere. The border machine is not located on state lines; rather, it acts on the boundaries of Palestinian cities and villages. A barrier appears in front of our vehicle. We get out of the taxi and climb onto a bus that stops again after a few yards. Some Palestinian policemen climb on to check documents and luggage. The bus starts again and stops a few yards later; they make us get off. We pick up our suitcases from practically the same spot where we made our entry. I am flooded by a sense of overwhelming sadness. The idea of Palestinian sovereignty appears to have achieved its final form in this place: a miniscule plot of land inside of which all procedures are complied with for a border crossing into … nowhere. The real border is 5 miles away. The police and the people in transit diligently recite their parts in this puppet theatre; everybody knows that it is make-believe, but no one objects to it. Back in the bus, we leave for the real border, presided over this time solely by Israelis. As an Italian citizen in a taxi, I could have reached the border directly. Sandi and Tala, as Palestinians, had no way of avoiding this sham performance. The trip from Bethlehem to Amman—less than 125 miles—takes more than eight hours.

We continue our journey, this time in the direction of the real border. After hours of waiting to enter the border zone, the moment comes to show our documents. Many ‘Westerners’ with privileged passports do not understand the anxiety of people who are faced with the possibility of being sent back. The Palestinian travel document is once again the paroxysmal expression of this control device. It is a travel document, not a passport, and it does not even specify a nationality. Even though Tala is registered on my passport, for the Israelis and
Archipelagos and enclaves

Palestinians she is Palestinian, and must follow the same route as Sandi, a different one from mine. I enter the area for non-Palestinians. Air conditioning and men in Bermuda shorts. I feel ashamed of myself for accepting this privileged treatment … me, here, with the tourists, and them, over there, hoping not to be sent home. Dazed, I obey the orders issued to me: ‘pay here, open there, get up here, go there, step down, step up, sit down’. After a few hours, I cross the bridge. I am in Jordan. I immediately start looking for the Palestinian exit, but it is not easy to find. The building is constructed so as to prevent human traffic flows from ever meeting up, like in hospitals, where areas and routes for healthy people and patients are kept rigorously separated. Breathlessly, I search among lazy Jordanian policemen and sweaty tourists for the door connecting the area reserved for Palestinians within the area for everyone else. I finally find the door, and before opening it, I feel like Jim Carrey in The Truman Show (1999) when he discovers the hidden door in the painted blue skyscape that may possibly eject him into the real world.

CONNECT–DISCONNECT

Contemporary cities and territories have been depicted by many scholars and the media as fluid spaces, without borders, lacking an exterior and continuously traversed by flows (after Harvey 1989; Castells 1996–98). Interconnected global cities form an autonomous transnational space (Sassen 2002). There exists a rhetoric and an imaginary tied to globalisation, to the new freedom of movement and to the elimination of distances made possible by new electronic and mechanical infrastructures. These representations of the urban and territorial reality seem to implode when something goes wrong. Today, albeit with some effort, a widespread awareness is growing that, parallel to the proliferation of new digital technologies, financial and economic networks, the number of borders, barriers and checkpoints for the protection of select networks is multiplying.

While flows of information and capital become ever more intangible, the fortification of physical space is accelerating. This has created a territorial system in which the archipelago (the smooth space of flows) and the enclave (the spaces of exception) cohabit (Petti 2007). These two figures inhabit the same space, but their cohabitation is asymmetrical. On the one hand, we have a global elite that is managing the space of flows, living in an archipelago-type world, which it perceives as the only world, with no exterior to it; while on the other, the suspension of the rules of the archipelago creates legal and economic vacuums that make the enclave system a black hole, a shadowy periphery.

The archipelago is a system of connected islands; enclaves are simply islands; it can accommodate both legal and illegal flows inside its space, whereas enclaves have no type of connection: they are isolated by forms of power that may be internal or external to them, a power they submit to or which they exert. There is a substantial difference between being enclosed and enclosing oneself: it is what distinguishes a concentration camp from a luxury community.
In my analysis of the spatial form of the archipelago-enclave, the territorial model of the Occupied Territories is based precisely on controlling the rights of movement and residence. The archipelago-enclave model has put into crisis the notion of citizenship which had defined the political relationship of the individual with the city ever since the classical age. In the era of globalisation, citizenship is no longer a factor of inclusion and equality that goes beyond religious and racial belonging. It has become an element of exclusion and discrimination, the device an elite uses to manage global flows of people, in complete contradiction with the proclaimed universality and equality of the so-called fundamental rights, especially those of freedom of movement and residence. Inclusion–exclusion and connection–disconnection are logics according to which cities were constructed and continue to be constructed.

In his book *The Capsular Civilization*, Lieven De Cauter (2004, 11) claims that gated communities and immigrant camps or detention centres are mirror images of each other, as with tourist areas and ghettos. The camp is the counterpart of the fortress. A fortress is an exclusion machine, while a camp is a reclusion machine. De Cauter thus points out that to reflect on cities and territories at the same time, we must think in dual terms (80): entertainment versus control, opening versus isolation. Connection is what makes archipelagos necessary and possible, while disconnection is what generates enclaves.

A group of islands creates an archipelago when relations or connecting spaces exist between one island and another, namely, when a space for the flows exists. Manuel Castells (1996–98) asserts that in contemporary cities this space is constituted by flows of information, organisation, capital, images and symbols; and thanks to new communication technologies, this flow is able to generate an integrated global network. For Castells, the space of flows is a form of space capable of shaping new urban conditions and a new type of society, the networked society. This space is governed by the most affluent members of the elite who live in super-connected cities and spaces, from where they exert enormous power. He describes them (1996, 412–15) as composed of three layers of material supports comprising a circuit of electronic impulses (microelectronics, telecommunications, computer processing, broadcasting systems and high-speed transportation), the flow space constituted by its nodes and hubs and the spatial organisation of the dominant, managerial elites.

For Castells, the space of these intangible flows is the fruit of technological innovations that have allowed people who are geographically distant to participate in shared social practices. From this point of view, the practices of control and segregation that are exerted on the movement of people in the physical space remain marginal. The theorists of cyberspace believed that access to new technologies would give life to a world with no more borders or barriers, in which bodies would dematerialise into cyberspace. This vision remained a utopia, belied by the dramatic evidence of billions of people who are excluded both from access to these networks and from free circulation in a world presumed to be without borders. Quite to the contrary, movements of bodies in physical space have become
subject to ironhanded control on the part of government and private entities. The consequences of these developments have yet to be explored. The illusion of a world without fences has been replaced by a reality in which the spaces of freedom have been occupied by an evolving form of power that has traced out the passage from a disciplinary society to a society of control foreseen by Foucault. Apropos of this, Deleuze (1990, 174–5—paraphrased) writes that:

the control society is a type of society in which mechanisms of control become increasingly ‘democratic’ … The normalizing devices of discipline that act within our shared everyday practices are intensified and generalized in societies of control; unlike disciplinary societies, however, this control extends well beyond the structural places of social institutions by means of a free-floating network. In societies of control we are continually monitored, and our movements are systematically recorded and filed away by means of a free-floating security network: we are all potential criminals.

If Foucault (1977) discerned the spatial model of the disciplinary society in the prison and panopticon, where deviant behaviour was brought into line with normalcy, in the control society, in addition to creating normalising institutions and penetrating the very nature of the body (digital fingerprinting and DNA testing are obvious examples), power invades the entire territory. Public and private spaces including homes and institutions are increasingly subject to widespread and generalised surveillance.

The space of flows, both tangible and intangible, is the favoured space where power exercises its control. Occupation of these places is what puts an elite in a position of dominion. Whereas, on the one hand, the elite can exchange information and travel faster, on the other, the majority are denied the universally recognised right of movement and residence.

To explode the contradictions of a space of flows whose access is fortified, controlled and monitored, this study will focus on the tangible displacements of bodies in space. An approach that investigates the regimes imposed on movements of bodies in space has the advantage of making the forms of power explicit. This perspective was also suggested by Castells (2003) who noted in his theory of urbanism in the information age (1996) that cities are simultaneously structured and destructured by competing logics: the logic of the space of flows, on the one hand (which link individual places into a network connecting people and activities in distant geographical locations), and the experiential logic of the space of place (experiences and activities within the confines of the nearby territory) on the other. Castells believes that spaces of place are redundant and superfluous in the organisation of the space of flows and power. In Castells’s view, they have no capacity per se to construct a critical discourse on contemporary cities and society. Spaces of place become ‘black holes of informational capitalism’ (Castells 1998, 166–7).

The point of departure, rather, should be a perspective that comes from within the places where the legal foundations of cities and states are instituted,
where relations between the city and its inhabitants are created, where the borders between a territory and a people are established. These are the spaces of exception, places that are anything but marginal to understanding how power is exercised over space.

**DISCONNECTION**

From the perspective of control over infrastructure network flows, while these methods act to reinforce connections, they are also the instrument by which entire parts of territories and populations are controlled, filtered and segregated. A space of mobility and flows for some always implies the existence of barriers for others. The creation of an infrastructure network presupposes a more or less conscious spatial and social ideology.

Disconnection from the networks generates a fragmented territory consisting of a set of separate, isolated enclaves that are segregated and suspended. The infrastructure network is the element that serves to enhance connections and the disconnections. This apparently banal feature has been underestimated by modernist urban planners, for whom modern infrastructure networks were the support for a harmonious spatial and social order (see Graham and Marvin 2001, 40–2). The road network, and the electric, water, sewer and communication grids were imagined to reach everyone in the same manner and at the same cost. The virtually standardised and uniform modernist infrastructure was constructed by the state in the collective interest. This ideology, which in some ways continues to survive even today, was put into crisis by two factors: the inadequacy of the rational paradigm, including planning, which was too rigid and bureaucratic to include the new dynamics of the urban agglomerations; and the privatisation of the infrastructure networks, aimed at connecting the most affluent and most lucrative islands.

This is the process of infrastructural subdivision and spatial fragmentation that Graham and Marvin (2001) described as ‘splintering urbanism’. This process, begun in the 1970s, has by now transformed many cities. New urban areas such as shopping centres, amusement parks, residential complexes, airports and resort villages are connected through a selective infrastructure network capable of forming an autonomous, privatised space, putting the notion of public space and the very idea of city into crisis. The concept of bypassing is fundamental for understanding how disconnection functions in the spatial model of the Occupied Territories.

**BYPASSING**

With the collapse of the modernist ideal, private networks providing potentially high-efficiency services for their customers were developed. Fibre-optic networks, superhighways, tunnels and bridges, and new energy networks tend to bypass the old networks or be superimposed on top of them, connecting some parts of the territory and ignoring others that are less appetising from a business point of view. For the places and people that are bypassed, all that remains are the
public networks or informal mechanisms. The bypass exists in all infrastructure networks, but it is most obvious in highway systems. Today, the highway system is redirecting the development of residential settlements and our way of moving around in space.

In the 1990s, privatisation radicalised technologies of control, differentiating various groups based on the power they held over the space. This has created a territory that can be crossed at different speeds depending on the person’s income, and national, ethnic and social belonging. Electronic devices such as sensors and closed-circuit video cameras watch over access points and monitor toll payments. Surveillance goes hand in hand with exclusion. Only the wealthiest users can bypass the congested public streets and gain access to the privileged road networks. The same roadways that were seen as devices for progress and modernisation in the visions of Frank Lloyd Wright (1955) and Le Corbusier (1986 [1923]) are revealed as instruments of control and segregation. An investigation of the tangible flows of people, rather than intangible flows of information and finance, must be given priority to bring to light regimes of control over movements. It is for this reason that this study has chosen to focus on the functioning of the highway infrastructure. The layout of a street can have the same importance as a border; it can include or exclude, unite or divide, create belonging or estrangement.

This point of view is radically opposed to the perspective that bases its analysis on the rhetoric of a world without borders where nation-states no longer exercise any power. In our view, old and new borders are being reinforced in both contemporary society and space, and nation-state politics appear to be anything but worn out. A look at the regime of control imposed on our everyday movements in space is sufficient to make this clear.

ASYMMETRIC PERMEABILITY OF SPACES: THE HIGHWAY NETWORKS IN PALESTINE-ISRAEL

FROM BYPASS ROADS...

The Israeli colonies in the Occupied Territories are strategic points for controlling the territory (see Benvenisti and Khayat 1988; Weizman 2007; Allegra et al. 2017). As points of control dispersed across a ‘hostile territory’, the settlements could not function unless they were connected to each other and to Israel through a continuous and uniform infrastructure. The link between colony and infrastructure can be viewed as the binary control code at work in the West Bank (Figure 4.1).

The combination of these two elements generates what Israeli anthropologist Jeff Halper (2000a) defines as the matrix of control. If we compare the map of the West Bank territory with the plan of a prison, we note that: a) the prison officers’ guard posts correspond to the colonies situated on the hills; b) the corridors that allow for the cells to be policed correspond to the highway networks that bypass the Palestinian villages; c) the cells where the prisoners are incarcerated correspond to the villages inhabited by the Palestinians. In addition to linking settlements, the
Figure 4.1 The matrix of control, 2005. Image by Alessandro Petti.
highway system blocks development of Palestinian villages, creating borders and barriers between communities that at one time were connected. According to the B’Tselem report (2004, 7–8),

Contrary to the customary purpose of roads, which are a means to connect people with places, the routes of the roads that Israel builds in the West Bank are at times intended to achieve the opposite purpose. Some of the new roads in the West Bank were planned to place a physical barrier to stifle Palestinian urban development. These roads prevent the natural joining of communities and creation of a contiguous Palestinian built-up area in areas in which Israel wants to maintain control, either for military reasons or for settlement purposes.

This strategy of controlling the flows and using the roads as barriers has its roots in the history of the occupation of the West Bank. Immediately after the 1967 war, in addition to the construction of Jewish outposts, a highway system allowing the circulation of military and civilian vehicles was needed to control the occupied territory. According to Benvenisti and Khayat (1988), during the decade of 1967–77, the highway networks were planned primarily along the North–South axis. Since there was no desire for integration with the Israeli highway system, no roads running east–west were planned. Attention was focused particularly on consolidating Highway 90, which runs from north to south along the border with Jordan and is easily reached from Jerusalem via Highway 1. According to the military strategists, in the event of an Arab invasion, this would have allowed military vehicles to easily reach the border and respond to the attack. During the next decade, with the presentation of the new master plan for the settlements of Judea and Samaria, the geo-political strategy for constructing the networks changed:

The Settlement Master Plan for 1983–1986 … expressly states that one of the primary considerations in choosing the site to establish settlements is to limit construction in Palestinian villages.

(B’Tselem 2004, 7)

The plan envisaged clearing distances between 130 and 400 feet for the construction of new highway routes, well over the lengths area required for the planned traffic speed and density. For major and regional roads, the clearance distance reached up to 2000 feet (approx. 609 metres). This brought the total of the area occupied by the infrastructure network to 91,923 acres, almost the entire built area of the West Bank (in 1987 the built area covered 106,255 acres).

Given these proportions, it seems clear that the objective of the plan was not to connect Palestinian villages but rather to build a matrix that would cage them in. The decision to dedicate such a large area to the infrastructure was a strategic expedient to physically and bureaucratically curb Palestinian expansion. The clearance distances specified in the plan allowed for the demolition of a significant number of houses. For security reasons, the new Palestinian houses could not be built less than 1.86 miles (approx. 3 kilometres) from highways. This regulation did not apply to Jewish settlements, which were built based on special urban plans.
The new master plan envisaged an integrated network between the colonies and Israel and at the same time introduced regulations designed to restrict almost any growth of the Palestinian villages. Many objections were raised, although they were ignored, while the approval procedures remained unclear. Although the plan was never formally approved, based on the regulations contained in it, the occupation forces went ahead with the expropriations and demolitions needed for the construction of roads reserved for the exclusive use of Israeli settlements.

The plan included the design of an infrastructure network that connected the West Bank settlements with the metropolitan areas of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Driven by lower rents, state incentives and the possibility of living far from the most congested areas, many Israeli residents decided to go and live in the new West Bank colonies, which were well served by a new and efficient highway grid. During the peace process in the 1990s, this logic reached its apex. According to the B’Tselem report (2004, 7),

Starting in 1993, with the signing of the Declaration of Principles between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (Oslo I) and the redeployment of Israeli Defence Forces to the West Bank, the bypass road system gained momentum. In 1995, new road construction reached its peak. Israel began the construction of over 62 miles of roads in the West Bank alone, more than 20 percent of all roadwork performed in that year.

The new extensive highway grid provided Israel with spatial control over the West Bank. The bypass road system is designed to link the Israeli colonies, cutting off Palestinian villages, and to effectively incorporate the West Bank into Israel proper. The flows are under direct control of the Israeli security force, which directs them through permanent and temporary checkpoints, barriers and military patrols. For a Palestinian traveller, there is no possibility whatsoever of going from one city to another without passing through one or more checkpoints. The matrix of bypass roads that circle the major Palestinian cities is a formidable straitjacket.

Most of the highways were constructed on land belonging to Palestinians. The expropriations carried out by Israel in the Occupied Territories since 1967 were, and continue to be, an instrument of colonisation and control. Before the 1990s, expropriations were carried out for ‘military reasons’. Once the geo-political situation changed, so did the pretexts for the expansion of new settlements and the construction of new roads. During the Oslo peace process, Israel expropriated land in the name of the ‘public interest’, claiming that the bypass roads were also useful to Palestinians. During the second Intifada, the expropriations were continued for ‘security reasons’. The line between military and civil law—between standards and exceptions does not exist. From time to time a space of legislative ambiguity is created to produce a formal justification.

By observing the transformations of the regimes imposed on the use of roads in the Occupied Territories, the evolution of the strategies aimed at the control and surveillance of undesired population flows becomes clear. Over time, although built in the name of the ‘public interest’, the bypass roads that allow
Figure 4.2 The regime of forbidden roads. Image by Alessandro Petti.
Israeli colonies to bypass the Palestinian villages became increasingly exclusive in character, transforming into ‘sterile roads’—Israel military jargon for roads that have been decontaminated of Palestinians.

... TO STERILE ROADS

Although the bypass roads were not built in the interest of Palestinian cities and villages, whose growth they served to block, before the second Intifada (September...
2000–February 2005) most of the roads were accessible to virtually everyone. Their use by Palestinians was limited, however, by several factors: lack of entry and exit roads near Palestinian cities; almost complete lack of road signs indicating Palestinian towns; public transportation stops restricted solely to Israeli colonists and soldiers. When the second Intifada began, Israel drastically cut Palestinian access to many of the roads in the West Bank, including various bypass roads. It is a regime of arbitrary and unwritten prohibitions, categorised by B’Tselem (2004), the Israeli association for human rights, as follows: a) roads that Palestinians are completely forbidden to use; b) roads that can be used by Palestinians only if they have a special permit that is extremely difficult to obtain and with a restricted use of vehicles; and c) roads whose access is controlled by checkpoints, some permanent and others temporary (Figs 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4). The regime is implemented by officers of the Israeli security forces through verbal orders and has dramatic effects on mobility. Palestinians caught using a road forbidden to them or lacking a permit risk being arrested and having their vehicle confiscated. B’Tselem (2004, 42) notes regarding this regime of prohibitions that:

The policy is entirely based on verbal orders given to soldiers in the field. The strongest proof of the regime is the local population’s awareness of its existence. Palestinians have almost completely ceased using many of these roads, even when entry to the road is not blocked by physical obstacles or staffed checkpoints. In response to questioning by B’Tselem, the IDF [Israeli Defence Forces] let it be known that an order from 1970 granted the authority to restrict travel and movement to anyone who is not an authorized military commander.

This regime of prohibitions is enforced using permanent and temporary checkpoints, barriers that block the roads and military patrols. In many cases, travel on the roads using one’s own vehicle is forbidden. Therefore, to be able to travel, Palestinians use group transport vehicles that shuttle between one roadblock and another. B’Tselem (2004) estimates that there are seventeen roads whose access is completely prohibited to Palestinian vehicles (about 75 miles—120.7 kilometres); ten roads whose access is partially prohibited (150 miles—241 kilometres); and fourteen roads whose use is restricted (225 miles—362 kilometres). It must be kept in mind that these distances are relative to a territory with an average width of 30 miles (48.2 kilometres) and an average length of 190 miles (305.7 kilometres). Forbidding access to even a few miles of a road can mean causing entire areas to be disconnected.

**TRAVEL FROM A TO B**

In January 2003 we conducted a two-day field study, presented in the form of a video installation, revealing the effects of the regime imposed on the sterile roads. On the first day we travelled along the route taken by an Israeli colonist to go from the Kiriat Arba colony to the Kedumim colony; the next day we travelled
Figure 4.5. Travel from A to B, 2003. Mapping multiplicity. Image by Alessandro Petti.
along the route taken by a Palestinian to reach the city of Nablus, starting from Hebron. Both trips start and finish at the same latitude (Figure 4.5). The first trip, in an Israeli taxi, took 1 hour and 5 minutes; the second, using various Palestinian group taxis, took 5 hours and 20 minutes. Along the route taken by the Palestinian traveller, we had to pass through a number of checkpoints, cover some distances on foot and change taxis; whereas for the route the Israeli traveller took, we used the bypass roads and passed through the checkpoints without being stopped (Figs 4.6, 4.7, 4.8).

Figure 4.6
©Multiplicity (Stefano Boeri, Maddalena Bregani, Maki Gherzi, Matteo Ghidoni, Sandi Hilal, Alessandro Petti, Salvatore Porcaro, Anniina Koivu, Francesca Recchia, Eduardo Staszowsky).
Fieldwork Sandi Hilal, Alessandro Petti and Salvatore Porcaro.
[left] Israeli path: bypass Road A60 south.
[right] Palestinian path: Wall at Abu Dis.

Figure 4.7
[left] Israeli path: bypass Road A60 central.
[right] Palestinian path: country road to avoid checkpoint.

Figure 4.8
[left] Israeli path: bypass Road A60 north.
[right] Palestinian path: on foot to the checkpoint.
As recorded in our logbook:

*Palestinian trip from Hebron to Nablus: 60 miles. Total time: 5 hours 20 minutes.*

January 13, 2003. We leave from the historical center of Hebron in the H1 special zone, where Palestinians are under a semipermanent curfew. On foot, we head toward the first checkpoint separating the historical center from the rest of the city. We take a group taxi which drives us as far as the limits of Area B. The road is blocked by a barrier built by Israel to stop vehicles with white Palestinian license plates from entering Bypass Road 60. We get out of the taxi and pass through the barriers on foot. On the other side, we find a bus reserved to Palestinians that goes as far as Bethlehem, which stops during the trip to take on other passengers. There are no cars with white license plates on this part of the road; the bus is the only vehicle allowed to travel along the bypass road from Hebron to Bethlehem. We stop in front of a checkpoint at the gates of Bethlehem. The soldiers search the bus. Shortly afterwards, we get off the bus and pass through the checkpoint on foot. On the other side, we find other group taxis which we use to continue our trip. We cannot proceed north using Bypass Road 60, which bypasses Bethlehem going toward Jerusalem, because it is forbidden to Palestinians who do not have the special entry permit. We are forced to detour toward the south-west. At Beit Sahur, we change taxis again. We go down a secondary street that is particularly dangerous, with lots of checkpoints. Whether or not we will be able to take this route is uncertain; we come across various Israeli army jeeps that are patrolling the roads. The taxi drivers call each other on their mobile phones to exchange information on which roads are passable and free of military patrols. Taking various winding roads, we get to Al’ Ubeidiya. The taxi driver asks us to get out here because there is a mobile checkpoint up ahead that the car cannot drive around. Following the other passengers, we go around it on foot and further on, 500 feet in the distance, we find other taxi drivers waiting to take us to the next checkpoint.

We reach Abu Dis. The taxi stops next to huge reinforced concrete retaining blocks that divide Abu Dis from East Jerusalem. Another taxi takes us toward the north, confirming that we can get at least as far as Ramallah, but not further than that. They tell us that once we get to Ramallah we will find out if there are any taxis for Nablus. During the trip, we leave Area B near Ma’ale Admim, taking Road 1 until it intersects with Road 458. Here, we see a lot of cars with yellow Israeli license plates and group taxis with white Palestinian plates. We get to the Khalandia checkpoint between Jerusalem and Ramallah, where we find a taxi for Nablus. We go back along a section of the road to be able to hook up with Bypass Road 60 going north. We are surrounded by a large number of colonist cars.

We continue our trip without stopping. Various colonies come into view as we drive past them. When the road narrows and becomes unpaved, there are no more colonies to be seen. Long before reaching Nablus, the taxi
abandons the main road to take a secondary street running through an olive orchard to avoid a checkpoint that you cannot get through. The street leads onto the bypass road. We drive along it for a short distance upto the Nablus entry checkpoint. We cross it on foot, showing our European passports to the soldiers, who are very surprised to find us there.

Many of the Palestinians are forced to go back. Once we've crossed the checkpoint, we take a new taxi which drives us to Nablus. The taxi drivers in Nablus tell us that we cannot continue north because there are no passable roads; the army has closed all the roads today. But after a few minutes, one taxi driver claims that he knows which roads to take to get around the checkpoint. We get into his taxi and take a dirt road, in the middle of the countryside, until the taxi driver tells us to get out before a checkpoint that will lead us back onto a normal road. In the distance, soldiers shout at us with their rifles pointed saying no one is allowed through here. Our journey ends.

*Israeli trip. From Kiriat Arba to Kedumim: 60 miles. Total time: 1 hour 5 minutes*

January 14, 2003. From the colony of Kiriat Arba, with a yellow-plated Israeli taxi, we start off on Bypass Road 60. We pass through the first checkpoint we come to without stopping. We note that some of the sections of the road we are on are the same ones we travelled along in the Palestinian bus. There are no cars with white Palestinian license plates. We pass through the checkpoint before arriving at the entry to Jerusalem. We bypass Bethlehem through a tunnel and a viaduct. At some points, the road is protected from stone-throwing by barriers. The bypass road literally climbs across the Palestinian village of Beit Jalla, passing over it like a bridge. We drive through the traffic for Jerusalem, continuing northwards. At the checkpoint, we are stopped and, after a few questions, allowed to continue. We proceed to the colony of Kedumin, where our journey finishes.

The regime of prohibitions instituted ‘for security reasons’ effectively restricts the freedom of movement of three-and-a-half million people on the basis of their national belonging. Similar sorts of practices have also been put into effect inside Israeli territory. The Trans-Israel Highway, a 220-mile toll highway built in the most densely populated area of Israel, has become the main axis of the matrix of control.

**THE TRANS-ISRAEL HIGHWAY**

Highway 6, the Trans-Israel Highway, was officially completed in January 2004. It extends from the border with Lebanon, in the north, to the city of Be’er Sheva in the south. The roads that traverse Israel and the West Bank from east to west all intersect with it. By observing Palestine-Israel from the point of view of its infrastructure network, its space—seemingly separated by walls and borders—is seen to be completely unified. The islands of the colonial archipelago in the Occupied Territories are joined together and connected with Israel through an efficient and
continuous highway system. The highway runs parallel to the wall for a long section, showing that the space of flows and apparatuses of exclusion are complementary. The wall acts as a membrane that allows some flows to pass while blocking others; together with Highway 6, it forms a single system capable of including and excluding, connecting and disconnecting. This logic does not apply solely to the West Bank: it also invades the territory of Israel. Halper (2000b, 3) writes,

The government’s long-standing and explicit policies of ‘Judaizing’ the Galilee … to ensure a Jewish majority here, and preventing territorial contiguity between cities, towns and villages will be furthered by the highway’s construction … The Trans-Israel Highway will require massive expropriations from Palestinian communities in Israel, while limiting their natural expansion through highway and Jewish settlement construction that primarily serves the Jewish population. Eighty-five percent of the land to be confiscated for the road’s construction is from Arab landowners in a state where only 3% of the land is Arab and remains unconfiscated.

The highway was constructed by a private company that obtained special status through a law voted into existence by the knesset in 1995 that allows it to confiscate land. Public interest is thus contracted out directly to a private company. The legal status of these companies is ambiguous. Public and private functions are mentioned depending on the contexts the companies are involved in. The highway is equipped with a ‘free flow’ toll system which eliminates the need for the driver to stop at the booth. When the vehicle enters the highway, it is scanned and photographed by an optic surveillance system. The vehicle owner’s data are collected by the private company through direct access to the Ministry of Transportation databases. The owner receives the bill for the amount owed directly at his or her home. Failure to pay can result in the owner’s driving licence being withdrawn, and, in more serious cases, the private highway police can confiscate the vehicle.

THE DIFFUSION OF THE MODEL

Practices for control and surveillance of the flows analysed so far are not specific to the Palestinian Occupied Territories. They appear in other geographical contexts—from Australia to East Asia to North America—and they take form in various ways: in the functioning of the toll-road bypass freeways in the large urban agglomerations of Los Angeles, Toronto and Melbourne; in the use of highways as ‘sanitary cordons’ used to divide new settlements for the emerging classes from the informal settlements of Istanbul, Jakarta and Manila; in the use of pedestrian bypasses in office centre complexes.

Alongside the privatisation that has taken place in many sectors during recent years, the system of private toll highways, has quickly taken on a rapidly growing role. In many cities, private highways have been superimposed directly on top of the old congested public transport network. The Riverside SR 91 Freeway
in Los Angeles, Highway 407 in Toronto and the CityLink Project in Melbourne are highway routes built as networks for bypassing crowded public streets. New major roadways in Istanbul, Jakarta and Manila are used as genuine sanitary cordons that divide residential neighbourhoods from the slums. This new generation of highways is used to bypass urban areas that are considered unsafe, and to restrict the growth of undesirable populations. The new toll systems that are built into the highway routes function as devices for control, for cataloguing and for automatic surveillance.

Toll highways built to bypass overcrowded public roadways use electronic control systems for entry and exit points so that drivers are freed from having to stop at toll booths. Some have toll fares that vary depending on the time of travel and the traffic flow. The construction companies that built them offer reserved spaces for paying customers who want to get across the city quickly. Offering faster travel times, toll highways can determine the lines along which future expansion of the settlements will develop. Given their size, this type of privatised space, which is increasingly occupying the lands of the large conurbations, puts the very notion of public space into discussion. Writing on Transurban CityLink in Melbourne, a 14-milelong highway that links the most affluent neighbourhoods with the downtown area and the airport David Holmes (2004, 177) notes, ‘At issue is the future of public space itself, in its social, technical and aesthetic forms.’ This is true from the point of view of bypassing of traditional agora like markets and the parking-based streetscapes, to the further privileging of the super-regulated private spaces of shopping complexes, another cocoon for which the freeway is the link. The creation of tollway spaces to travel from one area of the city to another contributes to the fragmentation of the territory: financial centres, luxury residences and shopping centres are the islands connected by toll networks that bypass spaces and populations in the archipelago of colonies found in major conurbations.

Highway routes are not exclusively spaces for flows, but can act as sanitary cordons that separate affluent neighbourhoods from slums. In Istanbul, in the wake of a period of economic and political renewal, new settlements for the emerging class offer ‘Western lifestyles’, social comfort and security from crime, and refuge from the multi-ethnic, chaotic and polluted city. For example Esenkent and Bogazkoy are two postmodern-style settlements built west of the city, composed of luxurious apartments furnished with swimming-pools and gardens (Aksoy and Robins 1997). They are separated by informal villages with houses constructed randomly along the highway routes that mark out the new class and identity confines inside the metropolis.

The same highways that were considered instruments of progress and modernisation in modernist ideology have become obstructions and barriers in Istanbul, blocking the growth of informal settlements. For Caldeira (1996), they have been perverted: the separation between pedestrian and vehicular traffic, which for modernism represented a victory for human health, is seen in Istanbul to be a strategy for prohibiting improper use of the major roadways. Individual private transport
Alessandro Petti

has been privileged, excluding the people who use public transport. Similarly, empty urban spaces conceived as ‘the right distance between buildings’ or ‘green belts’, have been transformed into areas where sculpture-like, fortified ‘designer’ buildings are located. The use of highways as a sanitary cordon can also be found in the endless suburbs of Jakarta, where gated communities, shopping centres and office areas are linked by public or private toll highways (Kusno 1999, 163). The privileged social classes have moved to the safest and least polluted places in the vast outskirts, abandoning the old unhealthy city with its poor infrastructures. The major roadways that link the islands of the wealthy bypass the old city centre by soaring over it (163). In Manila, to build the new toll-road bypass network called the Metro Manila Skyway, various informal neighbourhoods were demolished, forcing the inhabitants to evacuate. To reinforce exclusive use of the highway network that connects the residential islands, access is forbidden to traditional vehicles like Jeepneys, buses and motorcycles (see Shatkin 2005).

POSTSCRIPT ON THE SOCIETY OF CONTROL

During his lectures at the Collège de France between 1977 and 1978, Foucault (2007) investigated the passage of a disciplinary society into a society of security; a society in which there is a general economy of power which has the form of, or which is dominated by, the technology of security. Using three historical examples, he outlined the distinction between discipline and security in their respective ways of dealing with the organisation of spatial distributions. His first example was the project by Alexandre Le Maître (27–30), where the relation between sovereignty and the spatial arrangement of the capital are paramount. Foucault associated this spatial project with the age of law, in which the security mechanism is both legal and juridical. He illustrated its function through the treatment of lepers (24), who were excluded from the city through laws and regulations (see Shamir 2005, 206). Foucault’s second example was the seventeenth-century town of Richelieu, built using the form of the Roman camp (2007, 31–2), with the grid embodying the instrument of discipline where power hierarchies are established through the structural formation of the space. Foucault associated this spatial project with the institution of the modern legal system. During the plague between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the behaviour, circulation and contact between people in Richelieu was highly regulated as a feature of its securitisation. The third example was Nantes (32), where the space was organised in response to hygiene, trade and other types of networks. The suppression of city walls caused increasing insecurity due to the influx of the floating population of beggars and, vagrants, provoking a division between good and bad circulation (18). Foucault associated this project with the age of security. However, he cautioned that these three mechanisms do not appear chronologically. When a technology of security is put into action, for example, it may make use of or, at times, multiply juridical and disciplinary elements (9).

This schema helps us to arrive at a better understanding of how the wall built by Israel to encircle Palestinian towns, for example, is indeed a disciplinary
mechanism, but one which acquires force only due to the security mechanism of the road system. Indeed, if discipline acts in an empty space through isolation, hierarchy and repression, security, on the other hand, allows for a certain amount of circulation, since its objective is not to block flows but to monitor them. Security does not tend, like discipline, to resolve the problem, but, rather, to manage probable events that are only partially controllable while attempting to minimise the risks. Where discipline gives architectural form to space: consider how Israeli guard towers and military camps are organised in the layout of a prison plan, to allow for surveillance even when there is no one observing and guarding from the towers. Where security structures and regulates an environment within a multi-functional and transformable framework: consider how the permanent and mobile checkpoints work, not by attempting to resolve the problem of armed attacks, but, rather, by reducing their probability, in the same way that taking digital fingerprints for the identity cards issued to Palestinians by the Israelis marks the passage towards a biopolitical power that invades the very nature of humanity, transforming a people into statistical data. For security, control of the road circulation is equally important as the juridico-legal apparatus and the disciplinary apparatus. The problem is not one of delimiting the territory, as it is for the disciplinary mechanism, or at least not exclusively so.

I began this piece with a story, attempting to describe the asymmetrical functioning of the roads, for which there are no road maps or even written regulations prohibiting access. What we have here is not exclusion, a crude but blatant separation like South African apartheid, but a much more sophisticated regime. The problem is not about imposing a law that says no (if such a law exists) but about keeping certain phenomena at bay, within acceptable limits, by encouraging their progressive self-annihilation. The mechanisms in this type of control become increasingly ‘democratic’. It is for this reason that the socio-political future of Palestine-Israel is so relevant to countries that consider themselves to be liberal democracies. It is here that forms of government will come into being which will juxtapose freedom and domination, access and separation, liberalism and occupation.

AUTHOR NOTE

This chapter adapts excerpts from: Alessandro Petti, Arcipelaghi e enclave. Architettura dell’ordinamento spaziale contemporaneo, edited by Maria Nadotti, 2007, Bruno Mondadori, Milan, Italy.

NOTES

1 Castells’s (1989) analysis is largely based on research conducted during the 1980s and theorised as the space of flows (1996–98) reflecting the thinking of that time: faith
in the digital revolution, the end of history, the end of the nation-state, cyberspace and so forth. Later, partly in response to changes on the geo-political scene, Castells revisited these ideas.

2 Jeff Halper (2000b) used the analogy between a prison plan and the map of the West Bank specifically to deconstruct the theory of the ‘generous offer’ that Barak made to Yasser Arafat in 2000 of 94% of the West Bank. Halper claims that only 2% of a prison space is required to control the inmates. By maintaining a modest 6% of the territory, Israel would thus have continued to control all the borders, as well as the underground and the air space of the Palestinian Territories.

3 The expropriations occurred, depending on the cases in compliance with the laws in force prior to the occupation (Land Law: Acquisition for Public Purpose, Law No. 2 of 1953), or through the suspension of any of the regulations implemented for security reasons. The instrumental use of ambiguity and suspension of rules is also evident in the construction of roads created between colonies in the B areas, only subsequently legitimised through military orders.

4 In the Occupied Territories, an Israeli Civil Administration is, in fact, headed by members of the military (and subject to military orders). Palestinians must apply to this administration for construction and work permits.

5 As of July 2004, only 3412 Palestinians from among the 2.3 million Palestinians living in the West Bank hold a ‘Special Movement Permit at Internal Checkpoints in Judea and Samaria’.

6 In actuality, Palestinians cannot travel from one city to another in their own vehicle.


8 This section is based on a video installation called ‘The Road Map’ by Multiplicity (Stefano Boeri, Maddalena Bregani, Maki Gherzi, Matteo Ghidoni, Sandi Hilal, Alessandro Petti, Salvatore Porcaro, Annina Koivu, Francesca Recchia and Eduardo Staszowsky), see Hilal et al. (2004). Fieldwork and video recording were done by Sandi Hilal, Alessandro Petti and Salvatore Porcaro.

9 Hilal et al. (2004) noted that the regime, based on the principle of separation through discrimination, bears clear similarities to South Africa’s former racist apartheid regime.

10 Road 5 extends from the coast near Ramat, through the settlement of Ariel to the Jordanian Valley; Road 45, extends from Modiin, through the settlement of Ma’ale Adumim, to the Jordanian valley; Road 7, extends from Ashdod, passing through the settlements of Etzion and Ma’ale Adumim, to the Jordanian Valley. The north–south highways in Israel, Highway 2, Highway 4 and the newly built Highway 6; expressways Highway 60 and 90 in the Occupied Territories, together with the east–west routes listed above, form the main axes of the large-scale grid, flanked by a secondary road system that completes the matrix.

11 Translation of Cordon sanitaire, a French term for a zone around the city typically created to prevent the spread of infectious diseases.

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