

SPACES OF SUSPANSION

THE CAMP EXPERIMENT AND THE CONTEMPORARY CITY

Alessandro Petti

Although architects and planners have actively helped to design and implement camps, scholarly research on how the camp experiment has influenced our notion of the contemporary city remains scarce.

Clearly, the topic is a problematic one for researchers: there is a high risk of slipping into preconceived ideological schemas and critical thought is often unable to go beyond the horror that these factories of death engender. As Andrzej Kaminski points out, *a focus on death as such is neither appropriate nor sufficient for the purposes of a rigorous study on concentration camps and, ultimately, it leads down a blind alley.*¹ We will not focus, then, on the number of the dead produced by these structures; and while it is not in our purview to issue new judgments and condemnations (a matter for the courts of law, after all) nor can we close our eyes to the characteristics the form of the camp has assumed over the past years. What we will try to understand, rather, is how the camp form has contaminated our cities, the everyday spaces we inhabit, and our lives.

Rather than risking questionable comparisons, our intention is to understand if and how the camp condition has insinuated itself into the spaces of our daily life, in different and more humane forms to be sure, but no less alarming for that. In other words, we will ask how it is possible that the creation of the camp, a central event in the culture of modernity, has not infected, overrun, and invaded the spaces of the *polis*. More specifically, we will focus on what consequences an experiment of such political and spatial scope has had on the concept of public space.

What follows does not presume to provide final answers to these questions. Rather, it offers an investigation into whether the camp condition has not actually continued to exist, under new appearances, in the spaces of the contemporary city. To start off our investigation, we must first arrive at a general definition of the condition, one that can be used as both an object and a tool of analysis.

Although there are numerous studies on concentration camps, extermination, re-education through labor, and punishment, analyses that have investigated the possible common condition

¹ Andrzej J. *I campi di concentramento dal 1896 a oggi. Storia, funzioni, tipologia*, Bollati Boringhieri, Turin, 34. Further on in his study, however, Kaminski freely admits that "my intention in these pages is to judge and condemn the various systems of concentration camps on the basis of their size, ruthlessness, and number of dead."

of the different forms that the camp has taken over time are far and few between. There are several reasons why this type of approach is lacking. The main one is that these kinds of studies are often used as ideological weapons. Consequently, what has been written, mainly in the post-World War Two context, has mostly been limited to a comparison between the Nazi camps and the Soviet Gulags. Now that these particular forms—the most well-known and discussed—have disappeared, we can and must ask whether the *camp condition* has not survived them.

In order to address this issue, we will take the view that the camp does not pertain exclusively to totalitarian forms. In other words, we will subscribe to the "prophecies" of Hannah Arendt who by the end of the Second World War had already issued her warning that in a country with a democratic tradition such as the United States, the disenfranchisement of the citizenry opened the way to a new transformation of the camp form.²

The Nazis and Bolsheviks can be sure that their factories of annihilation which demonstrate the swiftest solution to the problem of overpopulation, of economically superfluous and socially rootless human masses, are as much of an attraction as a warning. Totalitarian solutions may well survive the fall of totalitarian regimes in the form of strong temptations which will come up whenever it seems impossible to alleviate political, social, or economic misery in a manner worthy of man.³

Spaces of suspension are therefore likely to be converted from pure instruments of death and forced labor into true forms of socio-spatial "government", into laboratories used to control populations and regulate the lives of individuals.

Before analyzing contemporary spaces of suspension, we might well ask whether or not some sort of prototype can be identified. Our theory is that their origin can be traced back to the European colonial "laboratory" of the late 1800s. It was in the European colonies that the camp was used for the first time as an instrument for "regulating" populations. This global, colonial perspective⁴ will make it easier for us to compare the original form of the camp with its contemporary form.

² In reality, the United States had experimented with the form even earlier during its occupation of the Philippines and later in 1916-17, in the *exclusion zones* set up in the American territory in the same country against enemy populations, meaning Italians, Germans, and Greeks.

³ Hannah Arendt, *Le origini del totalitarismo*, Einaudi, Torino 2000, p. 629.

⁴ A perspective that can be found in the genealogical study of the camp conducted by Federico Rahola in *Zone definitivamente temporanee. I luoghi dell'umanità in eccesso* [Definitively Temporary Zones. The places of excess humanity], Ombre Corte, Verona 2004

The colonial origins of contemporary spaces of suspension

The first concentration camps, created to regulate an entire population living in a territory, appeared in the territories occupied by Europeans between the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. They were established for security purposes for the most part, to create a bulwark against potential revolts. Along with Foucault, we can say that the Europeans responded to the problem of how to control and govern an entire population that rebelled against colonial hegemony by introducing not only disciplinary mechanisms (for example, prisons) but also mechanisms to prevent and govern "disorder" (preventive confinement might very well be the apparatus that all forms of colonial repression have in common).⁵

The concentration and confinement of a population within a small space served not only to suppress and quell any revolts, very often it served the paradoxical and ambiguous function of *protecting the non-combatant civilian population*. The intention of the colonial powers in establishing the camps was to "take care" of their people. It is interesting to note that from the outset the camp form had the duplicitous nature of being a place of "containment" of the citizens' freedom "for their own good."⁶

In the colonies, the camp form was essentially legitimized as a security measure for the internees: a measure made necessary by an exceptional situation, an administrative act that was outside the laws of the state or colony. It was a suspension of rights that was easy to implement in the colonial context, one which would later—as we know—meet with great success in Europe as well. Preventive detention, a special law used by the Nazis to legitimize the concentration camps, was actually not invented by the Third Reich: it was the English who used it to suppress the Boer guerillas in South Africa. At that time, one hundred and twenty thousand Boers, meaning colonists, women and children, were confined in concentration camps consisting of tents and barracks fenced around by barbed wire. Although the official justification for this measure was the need to protect the population that did not participate in the revolt, more than twenty thousand people died in the camps.

The concentration camps set up by the English in South Africa in the early nineteenth century are of a different sort than the ones created in the same period by the Belgians in the Congo or the Spanish in Cuba. Those interned by the Belgians and the Spanish were the indigenous peoples, a population without rights who were never granted citizenship. The

⁵ In the second part we will look into the interaction between disciplinary mechanisms and control mechanisms.

⁶ Some hundred years later it is difficult not to notice that the same paradoxical double nature even reappears in the name of the infamous "CPTA" or "centers of temporary residence and assistance": the "cure" is synonymous with reclusion.

population interned in South Africa was not made up of "barbarous, underdeveloped" natives, but rather, of white Europeans. This was the first glimpse of a phenomenon that would later become widely diffused: the camp could be turned into a security apparatus to be used against its own citizens. This is what happened later in Europe with the German and Russian Jews.

These first colonial camps, set up between the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries "produced" a new type of population, a "hostile population" composed of undesirable, dangerous, suspicious individuals to be kept under control simply because they belonged to a particular tribe, religion or ethnicity. The camp became a space where people who had not committed any crimes could be confined. Within its perimeters all rights were suspended and killings could take place with impunity. It is inside these spaces of suspension where a people are transformed into a population, a statistic to be "governed", that the possibility for extermination opens up.

This socio-spatial form of rule is common to various colonial histories: from the German colonialization of what is now Namibia, making it possible to exterminate three-quarters of the Herero population in a year, to the Italian concentration camps set up by General Graziani in Libya; from the villages built in Algeria during the French occupation, to those created by the English in Kenya against the insurrection of the Mau Mau.

In the laboratory of the colonial enterprise between the two World Wars, a control mechanism was tried out and perfected that would later be used against the same Europeans who had developed it. During the First World War, when waves of refugees and stateless peoples were created, the internment of entire populations became "the solution". In Europe, the first concentration camps appeared in Holland to "welcome" Belgians refugees after the German invasion; in England, as a measure for the internment of foreigners; in France, first to intern the Spanish Republicans and later the German exiles. To use Hannah Arendt's words *the only practical substitute for a nonexistent homeland was an internment camp. Indeed, as early as the thirties this was the only "country" the world had to offer the stateless.*⁷ It was in this historical context that the two extreme forms of the camp condition were created: the death factories of the Nazi laagers and the "new slavery" of the Soviet Gulags.

The effects of the camp experiment did not remain confined within barriers and barbed wire, however. They pervaded the spaces of the city, eroding the areas belonging to its citizenry. Disenfranchisement practices became common in France starting as far back as 1915, in the Soviet Union starting in 1921, in Belgium in 1922, in Italy in 1926, and in Germany beginning

⁷ Hannah Arendt, *op. cit.*, p. 394.

in 1935. The camp corrodes the political relationship that citizens have with their city or state, until it is destroyed.

Camps are a general political means for depriving all citizens of their rights. This deprivation of rights does not consist in the fact that a citizen is arrested at a given moment and sent to a concentration camp, but in the fact that it can happen to any citizen at any time.⁸

If the political representation of a citizen is to be found in the public space, what is found in the camp is its inverse, the place in which a citizen is stripped of his or her political rights, reduced to *bare life*. In this sense, the camp represents a sort of anti-city.

But what effects does this anti-city produce on the public and political space of the city?

The city beyond the inclusion-exclusion paradigm

If the city historically represented the place where the rights of citizens were seen to be recognized (often by excluding one part of the population that was kept outside the barriers), the invention of the camp is a mechanism that goes beyond the inclusion-exclusion system which first operated on the city confines between citizens and non-citizens, and today on the borders between nation-states. The camp marks the limit of this mechanism, the degradation of a political organization, a desperate attempt to preserve an outdated political order through the construction of a space of suspension inside of which all those who "don't belong" can be confined. The camp as a

piece of territory that is placed outside of the normal legal order, but this does not make it simply an external space. What is excluded in it is, according to the etymological meaning of the term 'exception', *taken out*, included through its very exclusion.⁹

The birth of the camp thus has the capacity to put into crisis the very idea of the city as a democratic space. The spaces of suspension are no longer inside or outside of it: they represent a sort of third area inside of which an increasing number of individuals who are excluded from the *polis* are shut away. For Arendt, what is produced in the camp is *the human specimen being reduced to the most elementary reactions...the model "citizen" of a totalitarian state; and such a citizen can be produced only imperfectly outside of the camps.*¹⁰

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 265.

⁹ Giorgio Agamben, *op. cit.*, pp. 189-90.

¹⁰ Hannah Arendt, *op. cit.*, p. 456

The condition that the camp experiment generated has insinuated itself into the city. Today, the spaces of suspension in which citizens are completely subjugated by power are clearly in view: in airport waiting rooms, in immigration detention centers, in the anonymous buildings on city outskirts, in abandoned factories turned into temporary housing by immigrants, or luxury residences for the wealthy, in business districts or holiday resorts. The last two examples show how the state of suspension can be used by high-income social classes to "suspend" their social, political and spatial belonging to the city where they live. Likewise, although for different reasons, business districts use suspension as a means for offloading tax obligations and social and environmental costs.

In spaces of suspension, spatial segregation takes on a new meaning, becoming a genuine confinement under armed surveillance: once inside them, your life is at stake. They signal the disintegration of the political relation between territory and population, becoming the *form of localization for those who do not belong to national or state orders*. The end of this unobtrusive form of the camp

is not to put to death or eliminate every foreign body in order to "biologically" constitute the area of inclusion, the people, the Volk; but rather, more unobtrusively, to "let live", by confining/territorializing individuals who are superfluous to an inclusive dimension that is undergoing a crisis.¹¹

Spaces of suspension are places confined and suspended inside the spatial and social order of a territory that foreigners should be members of, inside of which, instead, they are herded together. This is what we mean in a more general sense by spaces of suspension. It is in this sense that we will analyze some of the spaces of the contemporary city. We will not content ourselves with exploring spaces whose connections with the camp condition are obvious; we will also look into ones with more indirect relations.

The state of permanent global war that we currently find ourselves in provides the terrain for a renewed proliferation of the camp condition in every part of the world: places of suspension where dangerous and enemy populations can be preventively detained, places for humanitarian interventions, camps that precede or follow wars, ships people remain imprisoned on, refugee camps where people are born and die waiting to go home.¹²

¹¹ Ivi, p. 17

¹² Andrzej J. Kaminski, *op. cit.*, p. 72, [referring to P. Koch and R. Oltmanns, *Die Würde Des Menschen-Folter In Unserer Zeit*]: "In the view of the authors, concentration camps supposedly exist in Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. At one point in the book we find the following truly unwarranted exaggeration: 'The national stadium in Santiago was turned into the biggest concentration camp in the world.' Once again in the opinion of the two German authors, there are supposedly prison camps and prison islands in Indonesia, work camps in Albania, and South African Gulags in South Africa."

...if the essence of the camp consists in the materialization of the state of exception and the consequent creation of a space in which bare life and the law cross a threshold of indistinctiveness, then every time a structure of this type is created we are virtually in the presence of a camp, independently of the extent of the crimes that are committed there and regardless of what they are called or their specific topography.¹³

Spaces of suspension as a form of socio-spatial control

Now that we have arrived at a definition of a space of suspension and explored its origins in the colonial period, the hypothesis we would like to put forward is that spaces of suspension, called for because of a greater need for security, can be considered genuine forms of social and spatial control.

We have seen how they re-emerge every time the relationship between the territorial space and the population enters into a state of crisis. As might be expected, they first made their appearance in the colonial context, as an instrument for ruling local populations; later in Europe, at the time when the imperial spatial order collapsed; and finally, in our own day, when the connection between territory, state, and population enters once again into crisis under the disintegrative action of migrations and global economy and communications.

Called for as exceptional means for preserving the established order, as a measure needed to deal with extraordinary situations (migrations, wars, terrorism), over time they are transformed into permanent forms of government.

Following on Hannah Arendt's theory that the real aim of the camp is to produce citizens dominated by power, spaces of suspension can be considered the means by which power "rules" the population.

Foucault maintains that starting at the end of the eighteenth century in Europe, *the biological traits that characterize the human species became the object of politics, a political strategy, and a general strategy of power,¹⁴ of a political wisdom whose concerns were focused on the notion of population and the mechanisms capable of ensuring its regulation.* He cautions, however, that this does not involve the passage from a territorial state to a state of population, *but rather a shift in the emphasis and the appearance of new objectives, hence, accompanied by*

¹³ Giorgio Agamben, *op. cit.*, p.195.

¹⁴ Foucault gives this phenomenon the name of "biopower".

*new problems and new techniques.*¹⁵ Life become inscribed directly in the territorial space. In this way, the population became the main target of institutions, procedures, calculations and tactics which employ the security apparatuses as an essential, technical instrument. In the following section we will adopt this perspective so as to analyze the spaces of suspension in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and the security apparatuses set up to regulate their functioning.

¹⁵ Michel Foucault, *Sicurezza, territorio, popolazione*, *op. cit.*, p. 268.

2. TECHNOLOGIES OF CONTROL

The first total closure of the Occupied Territories was declared during the first Gulf War. For more than six weeks, the entire Palestinian space of the Occupied Territories was completely separated from the Israeli space inside and outside of it. For the Palestinian population, the Territories became a closed camp. From that time, and especially during the Oslo years, under the veil of the so-called "peace process", the Israeli domination apparatus had transformed what seemed a temporary situation of exceptionality into everyday rule. The Territories became a series of connected camps. The Second Intifada only provided the pretext for speeding up and consolidating the mechanism of domination that had already been fully functioning before the outbreak of the intifada; it also forced this mechanism into greater visibility. The entire Palestinian space was closed off, fragmented into sealed enclaves of smaller or bigger sizes, which the Palestinians can go in and out of only according to the whims expressed by the arbitrary decisions of the occupying forces, while the same space is completely open to penetration by Israeli soldiers and colonists. What Giorgio Agamben says about the contemporary system of power is undoubtedly applicable to the Occupied Territories, where it is perfectly recognizable: the camp has become the paradigm of Israeli domination. We are obviously not talking about a concentration camp, or a labor camp or even a refugee camp; it is still a camp, though.¹⁶

Control apparatuses of the territory and the population

The occupation of East Jerusalem and the inclusion-exclusion of its population and territory perhaps offer the clearest example of a rule based on a permanent state of exception.

In June of 1967, following the Six-Day War, Israel annexed 70 square kilometers of the Occupied Territories to West Jerusalem, ninety percent of which belonged to twenty villages in the West Bank and to the cities of Bethlehem and Beit Jalla. This tripled the area of West Jerusalem. The annexed territory was put under the jurisdiction and administration of the State of Israel. Citing the *Basic Law*, in 1980 the Knesset declared that Jerusalem was the reunified capital of the State of Israel (Figure 30).

¹⁶ Ariella Azoulay and Adi Ophir, *The Israeli Ruling Apparatus in the Palestinian Occupied Territories*, conference paper presented at "The Politics of Humanitarianism in the Occupied Territories", The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, April 20-21, 2004. The Palestinian sociologist Sari Hanafi also claims that Israel uses the state of exception as a permanent legal, political and spatial structure. See his "Spaciocide," in *City of Collision*, Birkhäuser – Publishers of Architecture, Basel · Boston · Berlin, 2006.

The annexation of East Jerusalem and the surrounding territories was not recognized by the international community. The city, like the rest of the West Bank, maintains the status of Occupied Territory. Many United Nations resolutions confirm this¹⁷ and it is the official position of most countries, including the United States. For international law, annexation can be valid only as a result of negotiations. East Jerusalem was annexed *de facto* and not *de jure*.¹⁸ This peculiar condition has produced a particular regime that rules over the spaces and the population.

The spatial politics of the "Demographic Balancing Act"

The guidelines for establishing the new borders of Jerusalem after the occupation can be summarized in the motto "the most amount of land with the least number of people," where "people" stands for Palestinians.¹⁹ The problem was to find a system that allowed the territory to be included at the same time as the inhabitants were excluded.

The border line, like that of the *barrier*, was traced out so as to exclude the parts of the territory with a high concentration of Palestinians and to include the ones where the population density was negligible. Many neighborhoods were divided in two: the part of the territory holding the highest population concentration was left in the West Bank, while the part with the lowest percentage was annexed to Israel.²⁰ The fact remains that in addition to the 70 square kilometers of land, 69,000 Palestinians were also incorporated.²¹

In determining the new borders of the city, then, there were primarily two main concerns: demography and security.²² Ideas, methods, and techniques for controlling the population became an integral part of the government's policies during 1975, at the time the *Gafni Committee*²³ established that the demographic balance between Jews and Arabs had to remain the same as it was at the end of 1972: 73.5 percent Jews and 26.5 percent Palestinians.²⁴ The

¹⁷ United Nations Security Council 252 (1967), 267 (1969), 298 (1971), 446 (1979), 476 (1980), 672 and 681 (1990)

¹⁸ According to the principles of international law, the occupying country must continue to apply the legal principles that were in force before the occupation. Israel abrogated all previous laws for East Jerusalem.

¹⁹ The Gaza "disengagement plan" is the most recent version of this biopolitical notion. See the interview with Ehud Olmert entitled "Maximum Jews, Minimum Palestinians," in "Ha'aretz", November 14, 2003.

²⁰ The cities and villages that were least densely populated whose lands were taken away are: to the north of Jerusalem, Beit Iksa and El Bireh; to the south, Bethlehem and Beit Sahur.

²¹ The annexation of East Jerusalem brought down the Jewish percentage to seventy-four percent. For the demographic variations see Salim Tamari, "Jerusalem 1948," in "Jerusalem Journal Insitute," 2001.

²² See Meron Benvenisti, *op. cit.*

²³ Inter-ministerial Committee to Examine the Rate of Development for Jerusalem, *Recommendation for a Coordinated and Consolidated Rate of Development* (in Hebrew), Jerusalem, August 1973, p. 3; also in B'Tselem, "A Policy of Discrimination" (in English).

²⁴ *Ibid.*

politics of "demographic balancing" were officially adopted not only for the development of Jerusalem, but also as a guiding principle for the urban plans of the national government.²⁵

The "demographic balancing" formula is equivocal, since the strategy behind it is not intended to maintain the demographic balance between two populations, but to encourage the demographic advantage of the Jews.

In the 1990s this theory was converted into the doctrine of "demographic imbalance." Faced with a huge influx of immigration from the former Soviet Union, the authorities tried to change the percentages in the "Demographic Balancing Act" through massive state investments into the construction of new housing for Jews. The planning of new housing in the Jerusalem area became the main instrument for achieving the geopolitical objective of transforming the territorial space in such a way as to prevent the city from being divided in almost any way whatsoever.²⁶

To allow the creation of new colonies, from 1967 to the present the Israeli authorities have expropriated lands mainly belonging to private Arab owners or to the Waqf (Jordanian government agency). Then and now, the expropriations are carried out ostensibly for public purposes,²⁷ which is not only illegal under international law,²⁸ it is also questionable seeing as the only beneficiaries are Jews. The lands expropriated for public purposes belonging to Arabs have been used exclusively for the construction of Jewish settlements, going against any principle of equality between Jewish and non-Jewish citizens.

Between 1967 and 1995, eighty-eight percent of the newly constructed houses, half-financed by public sources, went to Jews; the remaining twelve percent, primarily financed by private capital, went to Palestinians. The construction of new settlements exclusively involves the Jewish community, leaving the construction of houses for the Palestinian population to private initiatives and confined to limited areas of the city.

The disparity of treatment between the two communities is also evident from the different residential density: 1.1 people per room for the Jews versus 2.2 for the Palestinians. On the one hand, the Israeli authorities promote an intense housing policy in the areas expropriated from the Palestinians; on the other, they use urban planning instruments to limit the growth of the Palestinian population. In 1967, the construction of Palestinian residential settlements was

²⁵ *Ibid.* See "Plan for the Geographical Distribution of an Israeli Population of Five Million", Planning Branch of the Interior Ministry and the Economic Planning Authority of the Finance Ministry, vol. 2, Jerusalem 1972, p. 30; Moshe Amirav, "Israel's Policy in Jerusalem since 1967", Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation, Stanford University, July 1992, p. 12; "Forecast of Changes in the Population Distribution as Part of a National Planning Scheme", Ministry of the Interior, Jerusalem 1975; and "Preliminary Examination of the Implications of Establishing Settlements in the Jerusalem Region," Building and Housing Ministry, Rural Building Administration, Jerusalem, 1975.

²⁶ Ironically, to describe these objectives, the urban planners used the metaphor of the mosaic city.

²⁷ 1943, Land Ordinance, Acquisition for Public Purposes.

²⁸ IV Geneva Convention.

permitted in only fourteen percent of the entire area of East Jerusalem annexed to Israel.²⁹ For the Palestinians, urban development plans³⁰ are tools not for development but for spatial containment.

The Israeli authorities began to abolish the Jordanian development plans in 1967, without approving the bulk of the plans needed to replace them, however. Since Palestinians lack approved planning instruments, they are unable to request construction permits. The result is that thousands of people are not authorized to build on their own land. Driven by necessity³¹ (the Palestinian population has tripled since 1967) and not having the housing opportunities reserved to the Jewish community, many have gone ahead and built without permission. This has prompted the Israeli authorities to adopt a policy of repression which we will examine in detail further on. Even in the few cases in which the authorities arrange for and approve plans benefiting Palestinians, the results are much the same. These plans, like those for the West Bank, are limited to demarcating the areas that are already constructed, so as to block new expansions.

In some cases, the bordering areas are declared "public parkland" and therefore non-buildable empty areas, sometimes situated in desert areas, except that they are later expropriated and used for new Jewish settlements to be built on. The compression of Palestinian space has also been achieved by limiting buildings almost everywhere to one or two storeys, whereas in Jewish areas the buildings can rise as high as eight floors.

The authorities justify this disparity in treatment by citing esthetic reasons. The restrictions in Palestinian areas are supposedly to preserve the "agricultural landscape." This goes against the fact that only tens or hundreds of meters away from the "Palestinian agricultural zones" Jewish colonies are constructed with building rates that are four times as high. This inequality is also apparent in the services that the city offers its Jewish and Arab residents. Former mayor of Jerusalem, Teddy Kollek, made this declaration:

For Israeli Jerusalem, I did something in the last 25 years. For East Jerusalem? Nothing! What did I do? Nothing. Sidewalks? Nothing. Cultural institutions? Not one. Yes, we installed a sewerage system for them and improved the water supply. Do you know why? Do you think it was for their good, for their welfare? Forget it! There were some cases of cholera there, and the Jews were afraid that they would catch it, so we installed sewerage and a water system.³²

²⁹ Sara Kaminker and Associates, "Planning and Housing Issues in East Jerusalem", June 1994, p. 9.

³⁰ Town Planning Scheme.

³¹ See B'Tselem, "A Policy of Discrimination", op. cit.

³² "Maariv", October 10, 1990.

From an examination of the expansion plans limited to Jews and statements by politicians and planners, it appears clear that the demographic transformation of the space is subject to procedures for control by the state power in order to promote a nationalist, ethnic policy. These policies have an even more direct impact on the relationship between the people's space and lives when they regard the status of residents.

Permanent residency

Israel has granted the status of permanent residency to Palestinians living in East Jerusalem,³³ which is different from having Israeli citizenship.³⁴ Paradoxically, residency is regulated by a series of paragraphs contained in a law issued in 1974 called *Entry into Israel*, as if Palestinians who were born and lived in Jerusalem for generations had arrived after the Israeli occupation.

Their state of belonging to the space where their whole life has been lived and continues to be lived depends on a set of clauses that provide for immediate expulsion: a) if they live abroad for more than seven years; b) if they obtain permanent residency status in a foreign country; c) if they become a citizen of a foreign country.

In 1966, during the so-called peace process, Israel tightened up on these conditions, revoking permanent residency permits to Palestinians who were unable to prove that they had not moved their "center of life" outside of Israel.³⁵ Even Palestinians who live in the West Bank, a few meters away from the Jerusalem border, are considered to be "outside of Israel." A little less than half of the almost two thousand Palestinians who have a Jerusalem identity card live on the outskirts of the city, under the constant risk of losing their right to live there. Whoever has residency status cannot travel abroad, become a citizen of another country,³⁶ marry a non-

³³Permanent residents of East Jerusalem who wish to become Israeli citizens can do so as long as they meet certain legal conditions (established by the Citizenship Law of 1952): they must give up their citizenship from other countries, prove that they have some knowledge of Hebrew, and swear allegiance to the state. For political reasons, most residents of Jerusalem have not applied for Israeli citizenship. The state has in any case provided them with national health insurance and the right to work in Israel, the same as for foreign nationals. Foreign Workers (Illegal Employment) Law, 1991.

³⁴ The rights granted to a permanent resident are to live and work in Israel without the need for special permits, and to have social security benefits provided by the state social insurance agency. They also have the right to vote in local elections. Permanent residency is transferred to children only under certain conditions. If a permanent resident marries a non-resident they must apply for family reunification. Revocation of the right to residency is entirely up to the discretion of the Ministry of the Interior. [Entry into Israel Law, 1952, and Regulation 11 of the Entry into Israel Regulations, 1974]

³⁵ To prove that your "center of life" is in Israel, the authorities require the following documents: a rental contract in the applicant's name, utilities bills made out to the applicant at the address where they live, the child's birth or school certificate, payment of national health insurance, certification of employment, time spent in Israel or outside of Israel. A notification of this sort: *Expiration of Permanent Residency Permit: I hereby notify you that your permanent residency permit expired pursuant to the Entry into Israel Law, 1952, and the Entry into Israel Regulations, 1974 because you moved your center of life to outside of Israel.*

³⁶ A right reserved to citizens.

Jerusalemite, or live in the suburbs outside the boundaries of Jerusalem. If they do, they risk not being able to go back to their birthplace, to their home, or to their family members.³⁷

Since permanent residency is also extended to foreigners, Palestinians share in this legal status: in other words, they gain their political rights through concession. Their status and rights depend on political considerations and the benevolence of the Israeli authorities. Even if they were born and grew up in Jerusalem where they have their home, work, and family, they can still have their right to live there taken away at any time. They live in a permanent state of suspension.

This is particularly clear when their condition is compared with that of Israeli colonists: non-Palestinians with permanent residency who move to a Jewish settlement in the Occupied Territories maintain their status and rights as if they were living in Israel; Palestinians with permanent residency who move to the West Bank lose their right to residency.

According to the politics of suspension, then, when Israelis are involved in the move, the West Bank is part of Israel; when Palestinians are involved in the move, the West Bank is considered to be "outside of Israel." Since 1967, based on these stratagems, Israel has continued its efforts to reduce the numbers of Palestinians in East Jerusalem.³⁸

Various administrative and spatial practices are used by the Israeli authorities to control and regulate the people's relationship with the land. The establishment of borders, expropriations, and urban planning schemes are all tools that the Israeli government uses to strengthen its control over the territory and maintain the demographic primacy of the Jewish population.

The demolition apparatus

In an article appearing in *Le Monde diplomatique* in May 2002,³⁹ the French intellectual Christian Salmon writes that what struck him most during his journey "in the Palestines" was the violence against the land.

A trail of devastation stretches as far as the eye can see: a jumble of demolished buildings, leveled hillsides and flattened forests. This barrage of concentrated damage has been wrought not only by the bombs and tanks of traditional warfare, but by industrious, vigorous destruction that

³⁷ This condition is even more problematic if compared with the right given to every Jew in the world to come back and live in Israel whenever they wish to (Law of Return).

³⁸ For more details see B'Tselem, "The Quiet Deportation. A Joint Report", April 1997.

³⁹ From March 24 to 29, 2002, a delegation from the International Parliament of Writers—including Russel Banks (United States), Bei Dao (China), Breyten Breytenbach (South Africa), Vincenzo Consolo (Italy), Juan Goytisolo (Spain), José Saramago (Portugal), Wole Soyinka (Nigeria) and Christian Salmon (France)—went to visit Israel and the Occupied Territories. The pieces they wrote when they went home to their countries are collected in *Viaggio in Palestina [Journey to Palestine]*, Edizioni Nottetempo, Rome, 2003.

has toppled properties like a violent tax assessor....as if...the willful hand of Israel was striving to erase the past....slashing and plundering, uprooting, displacing and depopulating....[T]he forces at work here seek geographic fragmentation and dissolution, the abolition of the land itself....The territory has been mutilated....This is the first war to be waged with bulldozers. This is an attempt at deterritorialisation without historical precedent. This is total warfare that targets the civilian population and the land. This is war in an age of agoraphobia, a fear of open spaces, seeking not the division of territory but its abolition.

By demolishing buildings, Israel intervenes directly on the form of the lived Palestinian space. The main tool the Israelis use to transform the land is the bulldozer. Stephen Graham, in a text entitled *Constructing Urbicide by Bulldozer in the Occupied Territories*,⁴⁰ states that urbicide⁴¹ by means of bulldozers⁴²—far from simply being Israel's response to the horrors of suicide attacks—reveals its profound, deeply-seated denial about the inevitability and necessity of the Palestinian urban space. Bulldozer urbicide is part of a long-term Israeli plan: to tip the demographic scale of the region in their favor (**Figure 31**).⁴³

In the Occupied Territories, this apparatus has essentially two guiding principles: administrative demolitions and punitive/operational demolitions. Administrative demolitions⁴⁴ involve houses built without a permit and take place in the C areas of the West Bank and East Jerusalem where the Israeli authorities still have control over planning.

Punitive/operational demolitions are carried out for "urgent military needs."⁴⁵ These include demolitions performed to punish the family and neighbors of Palestinians who have committed (or are suspected of having committed) attacks against Israeli soldiers and civilians, an issue we will be examining in detail.

- Administrative demolitions

The West Bank C areas, making up sixty percent of the entire territory, are under the control of the Israeli military and civil authorities. The politics of spatial control through demolitions is based on essentially two principles: on the one hand, to limit the construction of new buildings

⁴⁰ Graham, Stephen (ed.), *Cities, War and Terrorism. Towards an Urban Geopolitics*, Blakwell Publishers, Oxford, 2004.

⁴¹ The term was coined to describe the deliberate destruction of cities during the wars in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

⁴² In the essay Graham points out that the Israeli combat techniques used against armed insurgents in the urban areas were used by the American armed forces in the war in Iraq. This connection is demonstrated by the fact that there are camps in the Negev desert for Israelis and North Americans where soldiers are trained to fight in an "Islamic city." Proof of this exchange is also provided by the fact that Israel supplies the United States armed forces with the "assessorized" 9 D-9 bulldozers used in Iraq.

⁴³ Many authors speak about the "silent transfer": instead of mass deportations, this involves a slow and continuous Palestinian exodus caused by the destruction of their residential space, making it impossible to live there.

⁴⁴ From 1967 to 2002, seven thousand Palestinian houses were demolished: between 2000 and 2003, more than half were carried out as punitive measures. Up until the 1990s, the houses were demolished because they had been *built without permits*. As we shall see, the authorities deny these permits in various ways.

⁴⁵ See B'Tselem, "A Policy of Discrimination", *op. cit.*

by means of urban development plans; and on the other, to keep areas free for the expansion of Israeli settlements. These objectives are achieved by:

- "freezing" urban plans for Palestinian cities and villages. The plans that are supposed to provide for the future development of the Palestinian community date back to more than sixty years ago. In the few cases of existing plans, the boundaries for the new expansions coincide with what has already been built. The plans essentially serve to legitimize the demolition of houses built outside these borders;
- suspension, since 1967, of land registration. This has made it impossible to verify Palestinian properties and therefore to obtain a building permit;
- lack of Palestinian representatives in local government bodies.⁴⁶ The fact that the main planning bodies are located on Israeli military bases stops Palestinians from having access to them.

Obtaining permits for new constructions in Palestinian villages in C areas is an extremely difficult and exhausting process. Salim Shawamre, who lives and works in Anata, East Jerusalem, describes how it can turn out to be a costly and interminable procedure trying to get one of these authorizations.⁴⁷

My family was chased out of Om Alshagaf, one of the more than four hundred villages destroyed by the Israeli army during the War of 1948. They took refuge in the Old Town of Jerusalem until the new occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip forced them into exile once again, to one of the refugee camps called Sho'fat. There were 5 boys and 5 girls in our family at the time and we lived in a 10 by 20 foot room.

After graduating in construction engineering, I went to work in Saudi Arabia. I stayed there for ten years and then I came back to Palestine. My parents still live in Sho'fat. I was the emigrant who had made money and could afford to buy a house away from the camp. So I bought a bit of land in Anata, a village not far from Jerusalem, and I applied for a permit to build a house on it.

Between 1990 and 1994 I applied three times, but the Israeli administration never gave me the permit. The first time they said: "We can't give it to you because your land lies outside the village development plan." Everybody knows that there's no such thing as a plan for Palestinian villages. Look at the streets. They date back to the Ottoman period and they're no more than ten feet wide.

⁴⁶ There are no Palestinian representatives on the Supreme Planning Council which decides on the validity of plans and the demolition of houses. From 1976 to 1995, Israel did not allow elections in Palestinian cities, thereby depriving local communities of any possibility for development. In many cases, Israel imposed an outright *mukhtar*, only allowing Jewish local councils to be instituted. While *Special Planning Committees* are created for the Jewish settlements, there is nothing similar for the local Palestinian authorities.

⁴⁷ Edited by Sandi Hilal and Alessandro Petti, *Senza stato una nazione*, Marsilio, Venice, 2003.

The second time they told me that they couldn't give me the permit because my land is on a slope, but everybody knows that Jerusalem is on a mountain, and that mountains are steep by definition.

The third time they assured me that I'd get it. Another year and a half go by and they write me to tell me that two signatures are missing. Every time you apply you have to pay 5,000 dollars, which go up in smoke if the application is denied. How many times was I supposed to throw my money away?

So in 1994, permit or no permit, I began to build my house. I lived there with my wife and six children until the darkest day of my life, July 9, 1998.

I was sitting with my family at lunch when I heard a voice outside. The house was surrounded by Israeli soldiers and bulldozers.

An officer comes in and asks, "Is this your house?" And I say, "Yeah, it's mine." "Not anymore," he says. "You have fifteen minutes to get your things and your family out of here, because we're going to knock it down right now."

I ask him what he's talking about and I push him out but the soldiers start beating me up. My wife closes the doors and the soldiers start to smash the windowpanes and throw tear-gas inside to force and her and the children out. My wife faints, the children are crying. They handcuff me. My neighbors come out to help us, but they're kept at a distance. Eighty people from the Committee Against House Demolitions arrive but many of them are arrested. Seven of my neighbors are beaten and a boy of sixteen throws up. In the end, the house is pulled down and we go to live in a tent.

The Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions and the Palestinian Land Defense Committee help us to rebuild the house. After months of work, on August 3, 1998, at 4 in the morning—remember we're still living in a tent—we open our eyes to find Israeli rifles pointed at us. They warn us not to move. The house is demolished once more, even before it's been finished. This time they also destroy the perimeter fence and the 52 trees I had planted around the house. They don't even leave me the tent, because Palestinians have to ask for a permit even for that.

I don't give up though, and with the help of a lawyer I try to get those infamous two missing signatures that are stopping me from building legally. Anata is a small village, so I ask all the residents to sign a document declaring that they have no objection to my house being built. I collect more than four hundred signatures, go back to the civil administration officer and tell him: "Take the two signatures you need from this list." You won't believe this, but what he answers is, "We've lost your file." It's completely impossible for us Palestinians to get permits!

So that's why I decide to rebuild the house without a permit again for the third time. With the help of many, on April 3, 2000 I completed the construction work. I moved into the new house with my family but we didn't even get two days to live there. The Israeli army shows up again with two bulldozers on April 4, 2000, once again before dawn.

They destroy everything, even the foundations. You can imagine what it means to live in your house for only one day. The children leave to go to school and when they come back there's nothing there. They didn't just destroy the house: they also destroyed me and my family. My wife still doesn't feel well. She didn't speak for two months. Our

youngest child has left school, and one of the girls is afraid to get up at night to go to the bathroom.

You know what I've had to hear from one of my daughters? "But how are you going to protect me if you haven't even been able to defend our house?"

It's not just about me. Ten thousand houses have been destroyed this way since 1967. That means more than 10,000 families have been left homeless. But I don't have any other place to go. I worked for ten years in the desert to give myself the opportunity to build a house. That's why, five months ago, I started rebuilding it for the fourth time. We're now working on the interior.

[A few months after this interview the Israeli army demolished Salim's house for the fourth time. And two years later there is still no resolution in sight.]

As Salim's story goes to show, houses are often built without permits because people need a place to live, for themselves and their families, a need which Israel does not recognize as a right. As for the Israeli settlements, the authorities make sure that their expansion plans are kept up-to-date. Furthermore, in many cases the houses in settlements are not demolished even if they are built illegally, and most of the approvals are given retroactively. A look back at how some of the colonies were developed reveals that the outpost that they originated from was actually illegal, not only under international law but under Israeli law as well, and were only legalized after the fact.

Starting from the Second Intifada, administrative demolitions were also used as reprisals or punishment.

- Punitive/Operational demolitions

The Israeli Military Forces Spokesman's Office justifies punitive demolitions by saying that *the house belonged to the family of an arrested/wanted/dead terrorist, or else the house was used as a post for firing on soldiers or civilians*. In reality, in most cases no explanation is given whatsoever. In the language of the military, punitive demolitions are referred to as *clearing operations*. The Israeli authorities consider Palestinian homes to be *legitimate military objects* even when their occupants have not committed any crime and are not even suspected of having taken part in activities that are hostile to Israel or damaging to the security of the state and its people. Occupants are advised to leave their houses five minutes before being demolished. These operations usually take place in the middle of the night. The houses belonging to neighbors who are not involved or even under suspicion are often damaged or destroyed in the process. In other cases the demolitions are used as a weapon to put pressure on the family members of the wanted.

Israel claims that a house demolition is a deterrent measure, not a punishment. But in actuality, demolitions are essentially based on suspicions and are carried out without a trial or

proof. A study conducted by B'Tselem has shown that at the time of demolition thirty-two percent of suspects were in prison, twenty-one percent were wanted and forty-seven percent were dead. So in addition to being illegal, the use of demolition as a deterrence weapon is highly questionable.

The true object of the demolitions is the living space of the Palestinian people. The punitive destruction of houses corresponds perfectly to the practice of extrajudicial executions. Based on data furnished by humanitarian organizations, extrajudicial executions carried out by Israel now number more than three hundred. Half of the dead are considered to be *unintended victims*, people who were near the target at the time of the attack.⁴⁸

The punitive demolition system also has its unintended victims. For Israel, this system is legitimate because the operations are conducted based on Section 119 of the Emergency Defense Regulations,⁴⁹ in force during the British Mandate: another emergency law in a state of permanent exception. The Emergency Regulations allow for the demolition of houses based on the suspicion of a particular offence having been committed. The house to be demolished does not necessarily have to belong to the suspect: it can be the property of the suspect's family, neighbors, or other residents of the community.

Until the Second Intifada, occupants received a demolition order signed by an army officer and could appeal to the High Court of Justice. Over the last five years, Israel has demolished houses with no advance notice and with no chance for appeal, claiming *absolute military necessity*.

These measures have never been used against Israeli citizens who have been responsible for acts similar to ones committed by Palestinians.

The punitive demolition procedure has been used since the beginning of the occupation. During the twenty years from the Six-Day War to the outbreak of the First Intifada in December of 1987, Israel has demolished 1,387 houses, most of them during the first years of the occupation.

During the First Intifada, the number of demolitions rose: from 1988 to 1992, Israel knocked down 431 houses and partially dismantled 95. From 1993 to 1997 they only demolished 3 and none from 1998 to 2001. From October 2001 to September 2004, they destroyed 638.

⁴⁸ Sari Hanafi has this to say about it: "In this way we can say that the Palestinian is a *homo sacer*: one who may be killed without due process and without the killer being punished (Agamben, 1997). The very frequent extra-judicial killings committed by Israel is possible since Israel exercises its sovereignty in a manner in which it is permitted to kill without committing homicide or without celebrating a sacrifice. This is killing which is neither capital punishment nor sacrifice but simply the actualization of a "capacity to be killed" inherent in the condition of the colonized people, i.e. the Palestinians," *op. cit.*

⁴⁹ The *Emergency Defense Regulations* of 1945 gave the British Mandate Authorities exceptional powers, including the right to impose military courts on civilians with no recourse to appeal, to deport individuals, to impose a curfew, and to demolish houses. B'Tselem maintains that the applicability of the Emergency Regulations is controversial: first of all because they were revoked by the British and in second place because they violate international humanitarian law. See also "Perpetual Emergency: A Legal Analysis of Israel's Use of The British Defence Regulations in the Occupied Territories," 1989.

These data demonstrate that "as a rule" the demolition apparatus acts as an administrative technique for controlling the space, but it intensifies when the population is perceived as a security threat.⁵⁰

The Nu'man Enclave

What might be considered the "purest" form of an enclave, of a space of suspension, are the cities and villages that ended up between the *barrier* and the green line (or between the *barrier* and the Jerusalem town limits), making up fifteen to twenty percent of the West Bank.

Almost a hundred thousand people will be living in an enclave that is totally encircled by the *barrier*.⁵¹ At least eleven genuine enclaves lie in the proximity of Qalqilya, with others to the north-west of Ramallah and around Jerusalem. One of these is called Nu'man (renamed Khirbet Mazmura by the Israeli authorities), a village south-east of Jerusalem whose inhabitants are considered to be *persons staying illegally*, unauthorized to be living on their own land (**Figure 32**).

The first houses in the village of Nu'man date back to the 1930s. In 1967, when Israel annexed part of the Occupied Territories to the municipality of Jerusalem, its lands were included in the new town limits. However, its inhabitants were not: they were given identity cards for the West Bank.⁵²

Over time, oblivious of their special status, the inhabitants of the village developed relations with the neighboring towns, unconcerned about the boundaries drawn on the maps. Until 1992, when the Israeli authorities who had made themselves scarce for years (there is no water, electricity or sewage system in Nu'man)⁵³ sent inspectors from the Ministry of the Interior for the first time, who declared that some of the houses had been constructed illegally.

At this point the residents asked to have an Israeli identity card, without which they are considered to be "persons staying illegally" in Jerusalem. Starting in 1991, Israel has required all Palestinians wanting to enter Israel to have a special permit, a requirement that was made more stringent shortly after the closing of the Occupied Territories. From that time on, the inhabitants of Nu'man became illegal residents.

⁵⁰ See B'Tselem, "Through No Fault of Their Own, Punitive House Demolitions during the al-Aqsa Intifada," in "Information Sheet," November 2004; and B'Tselem, "Demolishing Peace: Israel's policy of mass demolition of Palestinian houses in the West Bank," in "Information Sheet," September 1997.

⁵¹ OCHA updates, July 2004.

⁵² The reasons for this are not clear. From what we are told by the spokesperson of the Nu'man villagers, they were registered in the village of Al-Tal'a because at the time the *mukhtar* of the village lived there.

⁵³ The justification for why the Israeli army destroyed the water mains for the two villages was that because the villagers were living within the Jerusalem municipal boundaries, they were not permitted use of the West Bank water supply. At the same time, the Municipality of Jerusalem has refused to supply them with water under the pretext that the area is zoned as agricultural land. The electrical and telephone grids will suffer the same fate.

This special status was worsened by the Second Intifada, when the army blocked the road that leads from the village to Jerusalem and the two roads that lead to the south to Beit Sahur and to the north to Abu Dis. Today, the villagers are forced to travel these roads on foot. If they are found outside of Nu'man or in Jerusalem, they can be stopped and the army can prevent them from going back to their houses. Many have lost their jobs and are unable to make use of healthcare services; the children are unable to attend school,⁵⁴ unless they do long kilometers on foot hoping not to run into any soldiers (Figure 32).

Nu'man represents a concentrated formula of the devices that Israel uses to rule the Occupied Territories. Seeing as there are no development plans, the houses built by the inhabitants can be demolished. The area is in fact classified by the Israeli authorities as *white land*, a non-place. Nu'man does not exist on the authorities' maps and, being close to Har Homa, it stands in the way of the settlement's expansion plans. In the town planning scheme, the area around Nu'man is zoned as agricultural land and has to stay that way until 2020 to preserve the Har Homa development area.

The lands owned by the residents of Nu'man continue to be confiscated for the construction of the *barrier*, roads, and terminals in preparation for the expansion of the settlements. For example, there is a bypass road system that the authorities are constructing right on their lands: it will circumnavigate the Arab villages and connect the settlements to the south with Jerusalem. A number of houses in the village will be demolished for this purpose, while others will remain strangled between the bypass roads and the *barrier*. Israel has also institutionalized the checkpoints, transforming them into terminals for the transfer of goods. For this purpose the authorities have expropriated lands for the construction of the Kherbit Mazmura Trade Passage.⁵⁵ Today, construction of the *barrier* is planned in the area,⁵⁶ which will separate the residents of Nu'man from the rest of the West Bank. At the same time, the authorities deny them access to Jerusalem.

Various techniques of persuasion have been utilized in this obvious attempt to force them to evacuate: detention at road blocks, acts of intimidation, and offers of compensation if they will agree to leave their houses. Every time they meet up with Israeli soldiers they risk being expelled.

The construction of the *barrier* has created a paradoxical situation, on the one hand blocking connections with the West Bank and, on the other, closing off access to Jerusalem.

⁵⁴ In 1996 the Israeli Ministry of Public Education expelled the students of Al-Khas and Nu'man from the East Jerusalem schools of Um Tuba and Sur Baher because they had West Bank IDs.

⁵⁵ This will be one of the ten terminals in the West Bank that will effectively control the movement of the two million Palestinians who live in the West Bank.

⁵⁶ The construction of the *barrier* started in 2003.

Nu'man has become a pocket inside the *barrier*, a zone of suspension whose residents belong to neither area.⁵⁷

Testimony of Jamal Darawi, member of the of the popular committee to defend the land in the Bethlehem district:

Until 1992, none of us knew that as far as the Israeli authorities were concerned, our village belonged to Jerusalem and no longer to Bethlehem. When we saw that the documents distributed by the Israeli Ministry of the Interior and the Municipality of Jerusalem declared that our village was inside the municipal borders of Jerusalem, we were surprised. In 1967, Nu'man was a *kherba* (a farming community) with only twenty-five families living in it. There were no roads to get to it and it was so small that it wasn't even considered a village. Anyone who was born in Nu'man was registered in nearby villages, often in the town where the person in charge of the birth register lived, so that he could be contacted in the event of an emergency. The first road to connect our village to other villages was opened in 1971.

Until the Oslo agreements and the arrival of the Palestinian authorities, we lived under the Israeli occupation like all the other people living in the West Bank, working our fields as farmers, far from everything. Out of ignorance and a lack of information and familiarity with the West Bank, during the peace process the Palestinian negotiators agreed to consider Nu'man as a *special case*, like Salah al-Din, the main street of East Jerusalem. They didn't understand that there's a long way between downtown Jerusalem and our village, and they also didn't understand that Nu'man is really part of Bethlehem and is on the border of Bethlehem, not the center of Jerusalem. From that moment, because of this mistake, our life has been turned into an inferno.

Half our village is within the border of Jerusalem—hence, a *special case area* in accordance with the Oslo agreements—and half is inside the C area. The construction of the *barrier* delivered the final blow, but the tragedy of Nu'man doesn't finish here: a trade route between Israel and the Palestinian Authorities called the Mazmura Passage has been planned to cross over the lands of our village. This trade route is also a security passage, enabling the movement of two hundred and fifty trucks and a thousand pedestrians an hour, with three checkpoints. The plan is for it to be even bigger than the Karni Passage. We, the residents of Nu'man, have opposed it on all fronts and with all the means we have at our disposal, because this passage separates Palestinian zones from other Palestinian zones that are inside the West Bank and it's not a passage that lies along the '67 borderline.

In addition to the security passage in front of our village, they intend to build a huge military base to strengthen and protect the security passage and the separation *barrier*. The plan also calls for a bypass road that connects Har Homa and the Israeli settlements in Teqoa. Our village could be defined as a black hole between the *barrier*, the Jerusalem border, the Har Homa settlement, and the

⁵⁷ B'Tselem, "Nu'man, East Jerusalem. Life under the Threat of Expulsion," status report, September 2003.

bypass road, adding the trade passage and the military base in the future.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ Sandi Hilal, *Confini di un territorio occupato [Confines of an Occupied Territory]*, doctoral thesis, University of Trieste, 2006, p. 191.

3. OTHER TERRITORIES AND FORMS OF ENCLAVES

Native camps, homelands, fortress cities (South Africa)

South Africa offers a key point of observation for analyzing government practices involving the control and regulation of the space and populations. This is partly because of its colonial history, which dovetailed with the apartheid regime, and partly because of today's proliferation of fortress cities. We will therefore provide a brief overview of the history and development of its spaces of suspension, from the first colonial experiments to the social and spatial "polarization" of the post-apartheid era.

Colonization of South Africa began in 1652 with the *Dutch India Company* and continued in 1806 under the handiwork of Great Britain. At that time there were the Khoisan to the west of the country and the Bantu-speaking peoples to the east.

The 19th and 20th centuries were marked by the effort to trace out permanent lines delineating the boundaries between immigrants and autochthonous peoples. The first official act in the politics of control dates back to 1913 with the *Native Land Act*, which established reservations for the natives. This was followed in 1923 with the *Natives (Urban Areas) Act*, intended by the local authorities to confine the black community inside specific areas in the cities. These laws for separating and controlling the indigenous peoples were made more stringent through the *Slums Act* of 1934. This allowed the authorities to demolish rundown houses belonging to the natives and to delocalize the population to monoracial areas on the outskirts of the cities. Policies on housing, demolitions, and delocalizations were mainly used in the metropolitan centers as instruments to confine and control the population, not only black people, but also Asians and Indians.

These active instruments of rule were flanked by passive instruments, like limitations imposed on non-whites in the purchase and ownership of land and houses in white neighborhoods, or the use of urban planning laws to limit expansion of areas where black people lived.

During the years between 1948 and 1991, the system used for social and spatial control became an out-and-out doctrine known as apartheid.⁵⁹ The philosophy of apartheid was

⁵⁹ The Afrikaans term "apartheid" is known and used around the globe to refer to legalized racial and ethnic discrimination, especially in the areas of housing, work opportunities, and political rights. The word, originating from Dutch, means "separation".

introduced as a guiding principle by the National Party, winner of the 1948 elections, whose goal was to create a white Christian nation-state.⁶⁰

The political and economic privilege of the white population was maintained through an elaborate system of laws, issued in a continuous stream so that any loopholes could be immediately plugged. During the first decade, the authority invested itself with three important laws that gave a legal form to the apartheid system. The first, the *Population Registration Act* (1950), classified the population into three categories: white, black, and colored.⁶¹ This categorization of human beings was modeled on the colonialist policy of the unionist period before 1948 when the population was divided on the basis of "anthropological categories" such as skin color, the coarseness of the hair, and language skills. This classificatory system signaled the passage to a state-based racism, one which is characteristic of powers that are concentrated on the population.⁶² Nevertheless, it would be wrong to assume that the attention of the authorities was no longer focused on territorial sovereignty. Quite the contrary: the tighter the control over the population, the more intense control there is over the space.

Indeed, soon afterwards, the *Group Areas Act* was issued, whose objective was to confine the population to specific areas based on the divisions in the *Population Registration Act*. Cities and villages were divided into areas that were supposed to coincide with the occupation and the attributes of the designated groups. Groups of people who were found to be in areas other than those they were assigned to were forced to leave their places of residence and transfer to the areas assigned to their group. The connection between the colonial period and the apartheid regime can be demonstrated through the persistence of administrative devices like the *Land Tenure Advisory Board*, which before 1948 was responsible for establishing the areas reserved to Indians and which was later given the task of determining the *Group Areas*. Each *Group Area* was separated by a buffer zone of non-built land at least 100 feet deep, which was intended to act as a barrier between the various areas so as to limit social contact. Industrial zones, railways, and highways were used in the same way.

The most infamous case of forced "resettlement", perhaps, is that of Johannesburg. Through demolitions and expropriations, the Blacks in the city center were forced to move to Soweto, where the housing density soared as high as eight times the density in areas reserved to whites.

⁶⁰ In 1948, the elections were won by parties who were close to the landowners who live in the country. "Colored" people voted until 1964 when they were completely excluded through the establishment of the *Coloured Representative Council*, abolished in 1973. In 1984 a new constitution introduced a tricameral parliamentary system with one house for Indians, one for "colored" people and one for whites, who, in actuality, kept the power in their hands.

⁶¹ It included: a law banning interracial marriages; a law banning interracial sexual relations; the prohibition of public facilities (fountains, waiting rooms, and so forth) being used by all races; a law that provided for a series of regulations designed to make access to education more difficult for black people; a law that deprived people living on the bantustans (tribal homelands) of South African citizenship along with the associated rights.

⁶² The 1949 *Prohibition of Mixed Marriages*, which made marriages between Blacks and whites illegal should be remembered in this context.

The law that added a geographic dimension to the town-planning-based confinement was the *Bantu Self-Government Act* of 1959, which established bantustans for the first time (**Figure 36**). The objective was to provide the Black population concentrated in a few areas a form of self-government as a sort of independent state, so that Black South Africans would lose their legal rights to citizenship while the whites could continue to maintain their political power over the entire country. The first "independent" bantustan was Transkei, whose territory was divided into a series of non-adjacent enclaves. There were a total of four nominally independent bantustans,⁶³ the so-called TVBC states: Transkei (1976), Venda (1979), Bophuthatswana (1977), and Ciskei (1981). Six others—Gazankulu, KaNgwane, KwaNdebele, KwaZulu, Lebowa and QwaQwa—obtained limited sovereignty⁶⁴ (**Figure 37**). The reincorporation of the bantustans was not a simple matter when apartheid was ended, because the corrupt regimes which administered them—see the cases of Bophuthatswana and Ciskei—were resolutely opposed to reintegration.

The idea behind the bantustans was to confine the Black population once and for all inside a space that was outside the state order. Significantly, starting in 1960, following demonstrations by Black people against the authorities that had instituted the homelands, a state of emergency was declared and was continued to be declared every time the authorities thought it was needed. The creation of the bantustans and these declared states of emergency are directly associated. Based on the data collected by the *Surplus People Project* (1985), between 1950 and 1983 one million seven hundred thousand people were transferred from one area to another. The South African governments often chose to locate the resettlement camps on lands adjacent to workplaces so that these areas functioned as labor reserves.

There is an important passage from the confinement camps of the colonial period to the bantustans or homelands. While the camps were administered by the Native Affairs Commissioner and by the Department of Native Affairs and Education, the homelands were created as self-governed mini-states. For this purpose, new capitals were created, with just as many ministries and bureaucracies. The South African government financed investments in the homelands to prevent the Black multitudes from pouring into the white cities. To do this, they built industrial zones adjoining the homelands so that at the end of the day the workers could get back to their homes on the reservations.

In spite of state incentives, this political economy was never successful. The policy of unilateral secession caused agencies and jurisdictions to be duplicated. Parallel to the civil administration responsible for the Black population, the Department of Native Affairs and its later versions remained active.

⁶³ The international community never recognized the bantustans as states.

⁶⁴ Lesotho and Swaziland were but independent states under the British protectorate rather than bantustans, like Botswana which was historically dependent on South Africa.

An example of this system of sovereignty and semi-sovereignty can be seen in the mechanism of interior passports. The Black population had to apply for permits to be able to move from one part of the country to another. The authorities used this system to force the population to reside in their own homeland. The 1948-1991 period was characterized by an increasing fragmentation of functions, resulting in a bureaucracy that continued to multiply. The goal of this policy was to separate whites from non-whites, but also to break up the various tribes. This policy was at its most obvious in the proposal to partition South Africa. The idea of removing the Black population had been put forward since 1954, by D.F. Malan, the leader of Afrikaner nationalism and the prime minister of the first apartheid government:

Theoretically, the objective of the apartheid policy can be fully achieved by dividing the two country into two states, with whites on one side and all the natives on the other...If in time we get to the point where a division of this sort... is possible is a question that we will have to leave for the future.⁶⁵

During the 1970s, this policy for the partition of South Africa was accepted by most Black political leaders, who considered it a way for gaining emancipation from white domination. Following a demographic logic that furthered white interests, the government created ten Black nations. The aim was to fragment the political and geographic force of the Black people so as to preserve domination over the entire country. To achieve this goal, economic growth plans and regional development plans were initiated. The form the partition would take varied with the politics of the various governments. These proposals date back to the 1950s when the Tomlison Commission proposed to incorporate Basutoland, Swaziland, and the protectorate of Bechuanaland into the Union. This was how the foundations were laid for future Black states in thirteen percent of the entire territory. A symptom of this quasi sovereignty was the establishment of casinos in four of the homelands.

In the 1970s, Blench and Van der Roop proposed a scheme for dividing the country into two states: Capeland and Capricornia (**Figure 38**). In the first country, the white population would have been a minority in a predominately colored country, while the second country would have had a Black majority.

Over the course of the years, the removal of the Black population from rural areas has taken on different nuances depending on the political climate: from "separate development" to "separate freedom", euphemisms for white "control" and "supremacy" (**Figure 39**). The purist

⁶⁵ See A.J. Christopher, *The Atlas of Apartheid*, Routledge, New York and London, Witwatersrand University Press, Johannesburg, South Africa 1994.

vision of the white leaders collided with the reality. Forty percent of the Black population continued to live in areas reserved to whites and in all the proposed partition plans there were Black or colored minorities who constituted a threat from within to any idea of racial supremacy. The idea of an ethnically-based partition was definitively discarded by the white population in a referendum in 1992.

Even if the spatial and social consequences of this type of government were played out with the official ending of apartheid, the spatial and legislative structures continue to influence South African space and society. The classification of the population based on their race—white (Europeans), Black (Africans), colored—persists, since it refers to socio-economic differences that are still in existence. Although a small percentage of Black people have reached a social status comparable to the whites', the vast majority of poor people remain non-white. From the simple opposition between whites and Blacks, a system of inclusion-exclusion has developed, with Black and white residents of gated communities, for example, versus Black squatters and immigrants.

The increase in criminality,⁶⁶ which has made Johannesburg one of the cities with the highest rates of delinquency in the world, has created the conditions for legitimizing the fortification of entire neighborhoods, the closure of streets, and the use of private guards. In the name of security, the richest neighborhoods are armored, resurrecting the "pass" system that was in effect during apartheid: to gain access, a series of guarded checkpoints have to be passed through and special permits are required. The spatial structure set up during apartheid seems to have been recreated in spite of government efforts to the contrary, and thanks to private initiatives an archipelago of islands afloat in a sea of misery have been created for the rich.

Some authors have spoken about a new apartheid.⁶⁷ The theory is that the fear of crime has facilitated a new form of the residential spatial order that is remarkably similar to the segregationist system. The creation of these urban forms is also said to be motivated, however, by prejudice toward others encouraged by South Africa's exclusivist history. It may be useful to remember that although it is the whites who display the most fear toward criminality in South Africa, the true victims of crime are actually poor non-whites.

We can therefore conclude that, rather than delinquency or the fear of delinquency, what lies behind the development of the spaces of suspension in the contemporary South African city is a model of control over the space and the population whose roots run deep into the colonial

⁶⁶ For the whites, this is due to the inability of the new black government to protect citizens; for the blacks, it is due to an imperfect democracy and the flow of African immigrants.

⁶⁷ Charlotte Spinks, "A New Apartheid? Urban Spatiality, (fear of) Crime, and Segregation in Cape Town, South Africa," in Working Paper Series, The London School of Economics and Political Science, no. 01-20, September 2001.

period. It is the state of exception invoked for military reasons in the colonial era and to safeguard the state during apartheid that drives a regime based on spaces of suspension, one that is called for today by private individuals in the name of personal protection.⁶⁸

American Indian Reservations as "Unrecognized Territory" (USA)

Among the historic cases of spaces of suspension, the Native Indian reservations in North America occupy a significant place. They can be considered a sort of prototype for later experiments in colonization and territorial rule. Native Indian reservations were created by the government of the United States at the end of 1860 as a "Peace Policy" intended to appease the conflict between colonists and natives. The policy called for the relocation of various indigenous tribes from their lands to areas established by the government. Management of the relocation process was entrusted to clerics appointed by the Church, whose tasks included teaching Christianity to the local populations. For the government, the goal of the "civilization" policy was to prepare the tribes for citizenship.

The relocation areas were established through executive orders, but in most cases the areas were made smaller in response to colonist objections. The federal agencies for Indian affairs responsible for choosing the relocation areas were immediately accused of corruption and the conditions of the tribes on the new reservations remained appalling. Tribes who ignored government orders were deported to special land lots. The deportations took place with the assistance of the United States army, whose job was to limit and control the movements of the various tribes.

Native Indian reservations enjoy a special status in the political division of the United States. According to the law, Native Indian tribes are sovereign nations, which means that their legal authority is independent from the state and the federal government. Although they cannot act independently of the federal government, they are not subject to state law. This special status of semi-sovereignty is made evident by the numbers of casinos that have risen on their territory.

According to the law, reservations are "unorganized territory": although their lands are the property of the federal government, they do not belong to any of the states of the Union and constitute a territory that has not been organized into a self-governed unity. "Unorganized territory" is the formula the United States government normally used when referring to the lands in the west before they became organized into smaller entities. The American Indian reservations are governed by the Native American Nations under the authority of the Bureau of

⁶⁸ Karina Landman and Martin Schönteich, "Urban fortress", in "African Security Review", Vol. 11, No. 4, 2002.

Indian Affairs which is within the Department of the Interior. There are three hundred Indian reservations today. Not all of the five hundred recognized tribes have their own reservation. Given the history of conflicts with the colonies, the reservation lands are particularly fragmented and every reservation is an enclave unto itself.⁶⁹ (Figure 40).

Centers of Temporary Residence and Assistance

A particular space of suspension seems to be re-emerging out of the European space. Parallel to the cancelling of borders between the European member states, allowing citizens to move freely within the Schengen area, places where people are confined who do not fit into the new political organization have also come to the surface.

In Italy, the state of "urgency and emergency" declared in response to immigrant landings on Italian coasts made it possible for the first centers to be approved and established in record time in Sicily. Others followed throughout the country.⁷⁰ Once again, spaces of suspension are called for when the simple inclusion-exclusion mechanism ceases to be effective.

Centers for Temporary Residence and Assistance (CPTA) were established in 1998 by the Turco-Napolitano Law (40/1998), later joined with Legislative Decree 286, July 25, 1998.⁷¹ The Italian government has defined the CPTA as *the instrument of choice for implementing laws on the repatriation of foreigners entering Italy illegally, and to execute the repatriation process more efficiently. They are also a key means for ensuring that expulsion procedures operate effectively, which is a pre-condition for the proper implementation of an immigration policy based on annual quotas.*⁷²

Each year thousands of foreign nationals receive deportation orders or refusal of entry due to an actual or attempted illegal entry into Italy or by reason of their irregular stay; these orders call for the migrants to be accompanied to the border by public security agents and expelled.

⁶⁹ Today, the majority of Native Indians and Alaskans live in the major cities of the west—in Phoenix, Arizona and Los Angeles—rather than on reservations

⁷⁰ According to Amnesty International: "Of the fifty million people in the world who live in refugee camps, only a small part of them are in Europe. Of the seventeen million refugees and people under the responsibility of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in 2004 only four hundred thousand (five percent) sought refuge in Europe. In spite of these figures, the feeling persists in Europe that the intake system is hard pressed to keep up with the growing number of people in search of asylum and illegal immigrants attempting to reach Europe."

⁷¹ Consolidation Act of the provisions concerning the regulation of immigration and rules on the condition of foreigners. Laws and regulations pertaining to the CPTA subsequently introduced include: Presidential Decree 394/1999 (regulation implementing the Consolidation Act), modified by Presidential Decree 334/200416; directive of August 2000; Law 198/2000, the so-called Bossi-Fini law of July 2002 and Legislative Decree 241 of September 2004, later converted into Law 271 of November 12, 2004. The number of laws and regulations on the topic have created a great deal of confusion and there have been difficulties in interpreting the Bossi-Fini law whose provisions are consequently still under development.

⁷² Amnesty International Italia, "Presenza temporanea, diritti permanenti. Il trattamento dei cittadini stranieri detenuti nei 'centri di permanenza temporanea e assistenza' (CPTA)", AI Index: EUR 30/004/2005.

Pending their removal from the country, the people who are served with a deportation order are detained in CPTA centers. Many complaints on the conditions of detention and treatment in these centers that are not in line with international standards of human rights and refugee rights have come to light. These spaces are suspended from international law (laws on the right to asylum,⁷³ the convention on refugees,⁷⁴ workers' rights⁷⁵) and the Italian Constitution.⁷⁶

The interesting aspect of this is not only the serious material conditions of the centers' detainees, but also the physical and juridical space that is created inside the CPTA centers, airport waiting rooms, former military barracks, hotels, and containers used to house these people without rights. More than half are foreign nationals transferred from prisons; the others are asylum seekers who have been issued a deportation order, people picked up without documents or a permit, "dangerous migrants", foreigners who threaten public order and the security of the state.

At this time, thousands of people pass through CPTA centers every year: 14,223 in 2003 and 15,647 in 2004.⁷⁷ Each year only one half of the people detained in CPTA centers are actually deported from the country after their detention has ended. About one quarter have to be released because the legal time limit has expired.

Since 2002, Identification Centers have been set up to provide support to the CPTA in assisting

⁷³ An asylum -seeker is someone who has left their country but who has not yet obtained protection as a refugee.

⁷⁴ The 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees established that states have the obligation to protect those who are in grave danger of having their human rights violated on the grounds of who they are or what they believe in if they return to their country of origin.

⁷⁵ The international convention protecting the rights of all migrant workers and their families, which came into effect on July 1, 2003, is an important milestone in the recognition of migrants' rights.

⁷⁶ From "Legal Information for Immigrants": "In Italy you are deprived of your personal liberty when you are judged guilty of a crime punishable by a sentence longer than three years. A foreign migrant is imprisoned for having committed an administrative violation. According to the Italian legal system, being an illegal immigrant is not a criminal offence, but the life of an illegal immigrant is a life without rights, in which nothing can be claimed or demanded, not even eligibility for obtaining a "residence permit" in the event the state quota has been exceeded. Based on these arguments, many judges, lawyers and university professors (not the usual suspects, then...) have declared, even publicly, that the Turco-Napolitano law, especially the articles on the detention centers, violate a few important principles of our Constitution, including the prohibition against administrative detention. With this term, we underline the fact that the deprivation of personal liberty is not decided by the judicial authority but by the administrative powers, which in this case is the police. What characterizes this system are the absolutely discretionary powers given to the person who decides on the restrictive measure. To put it in simple terms, it is the individual policeman or carabinieri who stops the foreigner in the street, followed by the policeman at the police station, who decide if those who are stopped must be sent to a detention center. Only later will a judge check whether or not the decision was made properly, but this is a purely bureaucratic illusion, a rubber stamp on an action already put into effect by the police. Migrants thus find themselves deprived of the guarantees that normally distinguish the penal process and legal proceedings in general. They may find themselves alone and defenceless before the administrative apparatus, the state, and the repressive apparatus of the police and the carabinieri. This situation of being in a state with no rights persists during the detention phase. Unlike prison, where the supervisory magistrate or the penalty enforcement judge remains alongside the penitentiary administration for foreign nationals without papers, the enforcement of the order, which is not a sentence, is entrusted to the prefect or the chief of police. During this phase, the discretionary power of the administration can easily be turned into an abuse of power, also with regard to the detainee's requests (interviews, telephone calls, and so forth)."

⁷⁷ Doctors Without Borders – Italian Mission, "Rapporto sui Centri di permanenza temporanea e assistenza [Report on Centers for Temporary Residence and Assistance]", updated and published with the title: *Centri di permanenza temporanea e assistenza – anatomia di un fallimento [Centers for Temporary Residence and Assistance—the anatomy of a failure]*, Editrice Sinnos, Rome, January 2005.

verification of the personal data of the asylum-seekers being detained. Provisions regulating the identification centers have been in force since April 21, 2005, but the system is still not entirely functional.

In December 2004, the Ministry of the Interior informed the parliament that the existing CPTA centers would be converted into new "multifunctional" centers for immigration and that other centers of this kind would be established in the country. These projects are currently being implemented.⁷⁸ The growing confusion and slight differences between the functions of the various types of agencies make the legal provisions on which their operations are based exceedingly difficult to understand. What makes their special status even more serious is the fact that representatives of political institutions and information media are not authorized to enter.

The system of spaces of suspension for migrants does not pertain solely to Italy:⁷⁹ all of Europe, Australia and the United States have similar facilities. Known European centers number more than two hundred and fifty (**Figure 41**). The camps of today have assumed a number of different forms: from the German and Irish prison camps to the detention camps on the Greek islands; from the French "zones d'attente" to the closed centers for asylum seekers in Belgium; from the buffer zones on the European borders in Morocco, Algeria, the Ukraine, Malta or Lampedusa to the Italian temporary residence centers where migrants who arrive across the Mediterranean are all herded together.

The archipelago-enclave model takes on a geopolitical dimension: the enclaves of temporary residence camps are found within the European archipelago. In the words of Tony Blair, the British Prime Minister of the day, the spaces of suspension created by intake centers for immigrants require a "new approach." This new approach led to the creation of a new document in February 2003 that established two types of exceptional spaces: *Regional Processing Areas*, where asylum-seekers already on European soil are detained, and *Transit Processing Centers*, to be set up in areas with humanitarian crises around the edges of Europe.

The new doctrine of exporting the spaces of suspension was introduced by Denmark in 1986 with the proposal to transfer asylum-seekers to "safe havens." The concept of the

⁷⁸ On May 9, 2005, the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers adopted guidelines with 20 points on the procedure for all phases of the "forced removal" of foreign nationals.

⁷⁹ Agrigento: ASI/Contrada San Benedetto; Lampedusa (prov. Agrigento): airport zone; Bologna: Chiarini Barracks, via Mattei; Brindisi: Contrada Restinco; Caltanissetta: Contrada Niscima, Pian del Lago; Lamezia Terme: Coop. Malgrado Tutto, Pian del Duca; Crotone: Sant' Anna, Isola Capo Rizzuto; Milano: via Corelli; Modena: viale La Marmora; Otranto (prov. Lecce): Don Tonino Bello Center; Ragusa: former Somicem Agip, via Colajanni; Roma: Ponte Galeria; Melendugno (prov. Lecce): Regina Pacis, Loc. S. Foca; Torino: corso Brunelleschi; Trapani: Opera Pia Serraino Vulpitta. CPTA in the final setup phases during the first quarter of 2005: Bari, Foggia, Gradisca d'Isonzo, Perugia, Trapani-Milo, Lampedusa.

"protection zone" was introduced by the Danish Memorandum of 2004.⁸⁰ Here we see the old colonial arguments being dusted off⁸¹ in the name of protecting the local population.⁸² The politics of a "protection zone" has been accepted in Italy through agreements with Libya. There are a number of Italian camps on Libyan soil today.⁸³

G8: experiments in global rule (Genoa)

The G8 is the coalition formed by the presidents or heads of government of the world's eight most industrialized nations that has met annually since 1975 to discuss key issues in international economics and politics.⁸⁴ The members of the G8 are France, the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Japan, Italy, Canada, and Russia.⁸⁵ Each year a different member state takes turns in hosting the meeting.

Over the years, global summits have been the object of increasingly strong opposition on the part of non-governmental associations critical of the policies G8 countries have toward developing countries. The protest "debut" at a summit of supranational organizations took place in Seattle during a meeting of the World Trade Organization in November 1999. It was the first staging of a confrontation between police forces and protesters who oppose the G8's economic globalization policies.

Conflict flared again in Davos (January 29, 2000) at the World Economic Forum; in Washington (April 16-17, 2000), during the spring meeting of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund; in Prague (September 26-28, 2000) at the summit of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank; and in Nice (December 7-9, 2000) for the meeting of the Council of Europe.

Serious incidents occurred in Naples on March 17, 2001 at the Global Forum organized by the Italian government, under the sponsorship of the United Nations and the OCSE, in which

⁸⁰ Gregor Noll, "Visions of the Exceptional: Legal and Theoretical Issues Raised by Transit Processing Centres and Protection Zones," in "European Journal of Migration and Law," 5, 2003, pp. 303-342.

⁸¹ The idea of temporary protection in the 1990s had already been turned into an exceptional space that was legitimized by UN AGENCIES.

⁸² It is interesting to note that the language of war is used even in a country like Italy where immigration has always been a minor phenomenon, barriers, walls, military technology, and so on.

⁸³ This came to light in the Court of Auditors' report on the Ministry of the Interior's 2004 expenses. Tana De Zulueta: "The government has always refused to keep parliament informed."

⁸⁴ Gleneagles Hotel, Perthshire, Scotland, 6-8 July 2005 <<<http://www.perthshireg8.com/> >>; Sea Island, Georgia, USA, 8-10 June, 2004 <http://www.g8usa.gov/>; Evian-les-Bains, Francia, 1-3 June 2003 <<http://www.g8.fr/>>; Kananaskis, Alberta, Canada, 26-27 June 2002 <http://www.g8.gc.ca/>; Genoa, Italy July 20-22, 2001 <http://www.g8italia.it/>; Okinawa, Japan, 21-23 luglio 2000 <http://www.summit-okinawa.gr.jp/>; Köln, Germany 18-20 June 1999 <<http://g8info@library.utoronto.ca>>

⁸⁵ See the official G8 site at <<http://www.g8online.org/>>

delegations from one hundred and twenty-two governments participated. A hundred people were injured in the clashes between protesters and police.

Anti-globalization protests were staged again in Quebec City in Canada (April 20-22, 2001), at the Summit for the Americas. This is where a new security plan was inaugurated: five kilometers of fencing; arrays of anti-riot troops; hydrants, tear gas, cudgels, barbed wire; borders and road blocks to close off access; people stopped and arrested; helicopters, armored vehicles and shatterproof barriers; fortifications and trenches; special corps and special detention facilities.

The G8 held in Genoa from July 19 to 21, 2001 represented a sort of prototype of global rule over disorder, the moment when urban and legislative apparatuses were fine-tuned to make the creation of temporary spaces of suspension possible.

- The security plan

The government at the time, headed by Massimo D'Alema, chose Genoa as the site for the G8 Summit in agreement with the opposition. The choice was made to compensate the region for its exclusion from some funding from the European Union, even at the cost of having to deal with serious, foreseeable difficulties arising from the orographic and urban layout of the city.⁸⁶ The security plan was presented in a Prefectural Ordinance⁸⁷ on June 2, 2001.⁸⁸ On the basis of this ordinance which asserted that the conditions constituted a serious public need requiring special intervention, the prefect of Genoa adopted urgent measures in accordance with Article 2 of the Consolidation Act on Public Security (Royal Decree 773/1931) to ensure that public security and order would be maintained during the summit.⁸⁹ The prefecture's ordinance delegated the Chief of Police and police powers with the task of drawing up subsequent special provisions setting out the details of the plan. The first and most important measure established by the

⁸⁶ From the "Conclusive Document" dated September 20, 2001, "Investigation based on the reports regarding the incidents occurring at the G8 Summit held in Genoa." It may be helpful to underline that the forms of government analyzed in this section transcend any right-wing or left-wing divisions. Just as the Centers for Temporary Residence were motivated by needs shared by both sides, these are positions that cut across political parties.

⁸⁷ Prot. 288/DP issued by the prefect of Genoa.

⁸⁸ On May 23, the Provincial Committee for Public Order and Security examined the issue of the red zone boundaries; the following May 24, the prefect of Genoa presented the security system plan to the National Committee for Order and Public Security for the G8. On June 2, the prefect issued an ordinance that established a "red zone" under maximum surveillance and a security belt around it called the "yellow zone." The ordinance deferred the detailed demarcation of the zones to a later measure from the Chief of Police which was issued on June 30, 2001.

⁸⁹ In the appeal presented to the Liguria Regional Administrative Tribunal (TAR) it was pointed out that this precondition of urgent motives and a serious public need did not exist. "The Prefectural Ordinance was in fact adopted in preparation for the G8 summit to which the heads of the eight most industrialized governments had been invited to attend. The decision to hold the summit in Genoa had been planned years in advance. A state law had adopted financial measures for the organization of the event, and other measures deemed necessary to ensure the safety of the summit participants had already been put in place, once again by means of a state law (Article 4, Law 149/2000). It certainly cannot be claimed, then, that the G8 summit was held unexpectedly or without foresight since the event had been planned and arranged for well in advance...the lack of preconditions emerges from a reading of the recitals to the ordinance itself in which the prefect states that the measure is being issued with 'some anticipation with respect to the arranged date'." From the "Conclusive Document" dated September 20, 2001: "Investigation based on the reports regarding the incidents occurring at the G8 Summit held in Genoa."

prefect was the demarcation of the *different zones* on the days from July 18 to 22 (**Figures 34 and 35**)

- a) the *red zone*, under the strictest surveillance, corresponding to the historical center of the city and the port area,⁹⁰ where no foot traffic was allowed apart from a few limited exceptions;⁹¹ no vehicles, including public transportation, were permitted to enter or stop in the area, and all forms of demonstration were forbidden, including the handing out of flyers. Citizens of Genoa residing in the red zone were checked against Registry Office records;
- b) *the yellow zone*, a sort of buffer zone between the red zone and the city; other restrictions were established for this area, making it illegal to hold public demonstrations, distribute flyers, and to pass through or stop in a vehicle near several targets later specified by the police authorities. During the same four days the port, the airport, the overhead train, the light-rail subway system and construction sites were all closed to traffic. Between midnight of July 13 and midnight of July 21, 2001 the Schengen convention was suspended. In accordance with Service Ordinance 2143/R, Genoa's Police Chief classified the demonstrators into four categories based on how dangerous they were presumed to be: red, yellow, blue, and black.

To ease tensions, demonstrations were permitted and "theme" squares were designated in clearly defined areas of the city.

A battery of international police was set up and the Italian police force received training from the Los Angeles police department.

- Suspension of constitutional rights

The summit was preceded and followed by exhausting legal battles against the prefect's measures. Our intention here is not to go over the complicated legal aspects involved in the incident; what we would like to focus attention on is the central issue of the emergency ordinance being used as an instrument for social and spatial rule, and the suspension of rights associated with it.

According to the appellants, *an ordinance must remain within the limits of the principles of the legal system and may not be formulated to invade the sphere of activities reserved to legislative bodies and other constitutional organs, or, all the more inadmissible, declare unjustified urgent motives. The appellants' claim against the legitimacy of the ordinance was directed specifically at the part which struck at fundamental individual rights recognized and*

⁹⁰ The delegations were housed on six ships in the port of Genoa.

⁹¹ These included residents or people actually living in the area, people whose jobs were located there or who were obligated to provide mandatory public services or social assistance in the area. Access was permitted only to people carrying a special pass obtained in advance from the authorities.

*safeguarded by the Italian Constitution: the freedoms to circulate, to demonstrate, to express individual thought, and to perform work-related activities. The appellants maintain that the ordinance suspended these constitutional rights for five days by means of the urgent measures that blocked foot and vehicular traffic, demonstrations, and the distribution of flyers.*⁹²

With two different ordinances,⁹³ the Liguria TAR rejected *the incidental demands presented by private individuals directly associated with the Global Social Forum aimed at obtaining a suspension of Prefectural Ordinance 288/D.P. of June 2001, finding that, given the expected constitutional relevance of the public security needs (needs clearly discernable based on the social alarm created during similar international meetings), in comparing the interests in question, those that the contested measure aims to preserve should prevail over the damages that the appellants fear, and for which compensatory measures have been arranged in order to provide relief.*⁹⁴

- Applicability of the prototype: Sea Island

The aftermath of Genoa has made it clear that urban spaces and population density create enormous security difficulties. The political cost of creating security zones in the heart of the city is too high. Yet this prototype for governing social disorder and conflict has spread to many world capitals in the form of urban guerilla warfare; its spatial form, both physical and metaphorical, was fully manifest at the summit organized in the United States on Sea Island, Georgia in 2004.

Sea Island is a remote island five miles long owned by the Sea Island Company. It is the home of a series of gated communities and resorts, a military base, and a police academy.⁹⁵ The only way to gain access from the mainland is across a bridge controlled by a checkpoint. Like in Dubai, the prototype of the archipelago attains a sort of "formal poetics" of its own at Sea Island. Both the islands of Dubai and Sea Island in Georgia represent the clearest spatial figuration of a model that would otherwise have to be adapted to the spatial conditions of the city. *Realized utopias, heterotopic spaces*, as Foucault would call them, who in his list of heterotopias also includes honeymoons: it may not be a coincidence that in addition to being chosen as the site for the G8 summit, Sea Island is also the place where George Bush spent his honeymoon.

- The "Zone" as a space of suspension

⁹² See the website of the Democratic Jurists <www.giuristidemocratici.it>

⁹³ (nos. 944/2001 and 945/2001) July 12, 2001.

⁹⁴ See the website of the Democratic Jurists <www.giuristidemocratici.it>

⁹⁵ <<http://www.ajc.com/metro/content/metro/g8/16main.html>>

The division of the city into red and yellow zones is very similar to the division of the Occupied Territories into zones: different degrees of sovereignty for different degrees of *bare life*. Special biopolitical zoning de-politicizes citizens, depriving them of their rights, even if only for a few days (and in any case, we know how easy it is to turn an emergency into a permanent state) and classifies them according to their age and how dangerous they are presumed to be.⁹⁶ Through barriers and checkpoints, it is capable of taking away entire areas from its citizens, even the city center, the civic and public heart of Italian cities par excellence.

A zone is created where killing seems inevitable and perhaps even expected,⁹⁷ in which regulated spaces are transformed into spaces of suspension, like the barracks which were transformed into places for temporary detention,⁹⁸ where people can be locked up without the right to see a lawyer or make a telephone call: a reverse metaphor for prison.⁹⁹

It makes no difference whether it is located in Prague or Nice, Naples or Gothenburg, Davos or Genoa: a red zone is the sign of a field being marked out in the major global metropolises, a demarcation that, in practical terms, traces out a temporary, transitory exclusion, a void to be lost designed to break down in a short period of time; in other words, a state of exception.¹⁰⁰

The contemporary promise of a world that is open, accessible, and free, just like the postmodern promise of a global territory that is liquid and porous have been transformed into their exact opposites: a haunting, labyrinthine nightmare of prohibitions, walls, barriers, defensive shields, waiting areas, cages and cemeteries for the superfluous. Instead of widening its horizons, the world has closed down on itself. But the passage from implosion to explosion is a short one.

⁹⁶ This is similar to the permits Israeli authorities give Palestinians based on their age.

⁹⁷ This is the zone where Carlo Giuliani met his death.

⁹⁸ Bolzaneto and Forte San Giuliano are both barracks belonging, respectively, to the state police and the carabinieri. The G8 security plans transformed them into temporary detention facilities in order to house protestors arrested during the summit.

⁹⁹ "But the red zone is also a powerful reverse metaphor for prison. The barrier blocks entrance to it instead of preventing people from leaving; rather than imprisoning undesirables, it makes the rest of the social space into an exclusion; it takes pleasure in displaying the inside of its fenced-in area so as to better hide what remains outside. The prison thus becomes an open territory, a place without demarcations, what remains of the metropolis after its boundaries are marked out, the sea out of which the immigrant boats that sink off our coasts arrive. The red zone in Genoa required another spatial interval for its protection, a protective strip where the police and barricades, trenches and weapons could be set up; in a word, a battlefield, and what should make its appearance in the middle of this field but the prison," in Salvatore Verde, *Massima sicurezza. Dal carcere speciale allo stato penale*, Odradek Edizioni, Rome 2002.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

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